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Abstract*
 
 
This paper analyzes the problem of sub-national revenue mobilization in Peru and 
proposes several policy reforms to improve collection performance while 
maintaining a sound revenue structure. In particular, the paper analyzes the 
current revenues of regional and municipal governments and identifies the main 
priorities for reform. Among the most important problems are the acute 
inequalities and inefficiencies associated with revenue sharing from extractive 
industries. These revenues represent a significant share of sub-national budgets 
and currently they are distributed without consideration of the relative expenditure 
needs or fiscal capacity of sub-national units. In order to address this problem, the 
paper proposes the incorporation of a measure of fiscal capacity into the formula 
of the FONCOMUN, the municipal equalization transfer program. Other reforms 
explored include the reassignment of revenue sources between municipal 
provincial and district governments and the assignment of new taxes to regional 
governments.  
 
JEL classifications: H11, H21, H71, H73 
Keywords: Revenue mobilization, Fiscal decentralization, Peru 
                                                          
* This paper is part of the Latin American and Caribbean Research Network Project “Sub-national Revenue 
Mobilization in Latin American and Caribbean Countries.” 
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Abbreviations and acronyms (and translations) 
DGAES General Directorate of Economic and Social Affairs (Dirección General de 
Asuntos Económicos y Sociales) 
DNCP National Directorate of Public Accounts (Dirección Nacional de Contabilidad 
Pública) 
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
FONCOMUN Municipal Compensation Fund (Fundo de Compensación Municipal) 
FONCOR Regional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Regional) 
INEI National Institute of Statistics and Information (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística e Informática) 
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finances (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) 
RENAMU National Registry of Municipalities (Registro Nacional de Municipalidades) 
SAT Tax Administration Service (Servicio de Administración Tributaria) 
DS Supreme Decree (Decreto Supremo) 
SUNAT National Superintendence of Tax Administration (Superintendencia Nacional 
de Administración Tributaria) 
UIT Tributary Tax Unit (Unidad Impositiva Tributaria) 
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1. Introduction  
 
The current fiscal decentralization process in Peru began in 2002 with an amendment to the 
Constitution and Legislative Decree No. 955, the current Fiscal Decentralization Law. Since 
then, decentralization reform has been at the center of national and sub-national political 
agendas. After eight years the process is in some respects relatively advanced; the legal 
framework covers most aspects of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, and each 
group of sub-national governments (regional and local) in the aggregate commanded about 20 
percent of total public expenditures in 2009. 
However, there are still important aspects of the process that remain problematic and 
which will require substantial reform efforts. In a context of acute inter-jurisdictional fiscal 
inequalities, with a few significant exceptions, sub-national governments are currently not 
collecting sizeable amounts of revenues on their own. This might be due to a number of reasons, 
including lack of administrative and technical capacity or simply sub-national authorities’ 
interest in avoiding the economic and political costs of own revenue collections. Indeed, most 
sub-national governments are highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers. 
In this paper we attempt to identify the main factors explaining the poor revenue 
collection performance of sub-national governments in Peru, and propose policy reforms to 
improve revenue mobilization, paying particular attention to their feasibility. Because 
government units at the local and regional levels face diverse institutional conditions, we use 
different analytical approaches and provide separate strategies to improve revenue collection 
performance at those two levels of government. At the local level, with a few exceptions, current 
tax assignments roughly follow best international practices; thus our analysis focuses on possible 
reforms to improve tax collections performance. On the other hand, there are still no tax 
instruments assigned to regional governments, so in this case we suggest alternative approaches 
to provide them with own revenue sources and create fiscal autonomy and accountability.  
Because they are closely interconnected in Peru, we propose to address the problem of 
revenue mobilization together with the problem of unequal distribution of fiscal resources caused 
by the current arrangements for revenue sharing from extractive industries on a derivation basis. 
Besides the obvious costs imposed on the cohesiveness of society on equity grounds, the current 
extent of inter-jurisdictional inequalities in Peru also imposes efficiency costs that have not been 
sufficiently stressed in prior analyses of the Peruvian decentralization process. These efficiency 
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losses are produced by the different expenditure decision rules, resulting from the unequal fiscal 
conditions across sub-national governments. This is perhaps the most important message of this 
paper: improving revenue mobilization in Peru requires a systemic approach, in which equity and 
efficiency are addressed simultaneously while sub-national governments are provided with both 
the ability and the incentives to maximize own revenue collections.  
We present alternative methodologies to estimate the fiscal capacity or revenue potential 
of sub-national governments, and propose to incorporate one of these measures into the 
distribution formula of the equalization transfer program currently implemented at the local and 
regional levels. The main goal of this proposed reform component is to improve the equalizing 
power of the current equalization transfer programs by virtually excluding from the grant those 
sub-national governments receiving significant revenues from extractive industries. We discuss 
why this would seem to be a fiscally and politically feasible approach to improving the equity 
and efficiency of the Peruvian fiscal decentralization system. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the current revenue 
structure of regional and local governments. Section 3 present an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of revenue collections at the local level and identifies some priorities for reform at 
that level. Section 4 examines the municipal compensation fund and other transfers to local 
governments. Section 5 describes several alternative methodologies to measuring revenue 
potential, which could be incorporated into the distribution formula of the equalization transfer 
programs in Peru, and analyzes the results of their application. Section 6 proposes alternative 
sources of revenue autonomy for regional governments. Section 7 summarizes the reform 
proposals. Section 8 discuses some of the relevant political economy considerations surrounding 
the proposals. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The Current Revenue Structure of Sub-national Governments in Peru 
Since the beginning of the current decentralization process in Peru, sub-national governments 
have represented a significant share of the total public budget. During 2002, total expenditures at 
the sub-national level reached almost 14 billion nuevos soles (see Table 1), representing 39.5 
percent of total expenditures by the central and sub-national governments.1
                                                          
1 The available data for 2002 do not distinguish between regional and municipal governments. 
 More recently, in 
2008, the share of sub-national expenditures has declined slightly, but still remains quite 
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significant. The sum of regional and local expenditures was around 25 billion nuevos soles, or 
36.6 percent of general government outlays. In spite of this decline, the decentralization of 
expenditures has deepened, as a great number of responsibilities have been assigned to sub-
national governments during the period.2
Such a low share of own revenues implies a great reliance on intergovernmental transfers. 
In Table 1 we present the government budgets as they are organized by the National Directorate 
of Public Accounts (DNCP is the acronym in Spanish), the official source of public budget 
accounts in Peru, but they can be misleading. In 2008 regional governments received 9,104 
million nuevos soles in transfers classified as “ordinary resources” (not in the table) which are 
not reported as revenues, but finance most of the de-concentrated regional expenditures on 
education, health, social protection and pensions, among other areas.
 In contrast, the decentralization of revenue sources 
remains quite insignificant. In 2002 the share of own revenues in total expenditures for sub-
national governments was 11 percent, and in 2008 this share rose to only 12.3 percent, with local 
governments collecting most of these revenues.  
3
The great importance of intergovernmental transfers for the financing of sub-national 
governments in Peru leads to a number of problems that have been well documented in the 
decentralization literature. On the one hand, dependency on revenues from transfers limits the 
efficient behavior and accountability of sub-national authorities. Sub-national autonomy, now on 
the expenditure side, is further reduced because most of the transfers are conditional to centrally 
determined uses. 
 What this means is that the 
negative “financial results” obtained by sub-national governments in 2002 and regional 
governments in 2008 (on the bottom of Table 1) are, in reality, covered by transfers from the 
central government. 
 
                                                          
2 USAID/Perú ProDescentralización (2010a) provides a recent review of the process of transfer of functions to sub-
national governments. 
3 The term “de-concentration” is used in the literature to refer those assignments in which sub-national authorities 
have very limited or no decision making autonomy, while the concept of decentralization implicitly designates a 
significant degree of autonomy. The amount of ordinary resources is determined annually by the DNCP in an 
historical basis, and the use of these funds is largely subject to central government guidelines. An analysis of de-
concentrated expenditures at the regional level in Peru is provided in World Bank (2009). 
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Table 1. Composition of Revenues by Level of Government, 2002 and 2008 
(in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of total expenditures 
by level of government) 
 
 2002 2008 
 
Central 
government 
Sub-national 
governments 
Central 
government 
Regional 
governments 
Local 
governments 
  %  %  %  %  % 
           
Own Revenues 24,939 116.6 1,530 11.0 60,438 136.0 459 3.7 2,688 20.4 
Taxes and contributions 22,429 104.9 731 5.2 51,470 115.8 14 0.1 1,406 10.7 
Charges and fees 965 4.5 966 6.9 3,922 8.8 222 1.8 1,583 12.0 
           
Capital Revenues 1,350 6.3 41 0.3 325 0.7 14 0.1 25 0.2 
           
Transfers (*) -240 -1.1 1,436 10.3 -827 -1.9 2,365 19.0 8,629 65.4 
From extractive industries   793 5.7   1,669 13.4 5,145 39.0 
           
Net financial debt 97 0.5 -51 -0.4 -844 -1.9 67 0.5 120 0.9 
           
Accumulated balances 267 1.2 466 3.3 5,317 12.0 2,669 21.4 5,170 39.2 
           
Total revenues 26,414 123.5 3,421 24.6 64,409 144.9 5,574 44.7 16,633 126.1 
           
Total expenditures 21,383 100.0 13,933 100.0 44,456 100.0 12,479 100.0 13,194 100.0 
           
Financial result 5,032 23.5 -10,512 -75.4 19,953 44.9 -6,905 -55.3 3,439 26.1 
           
(*) The full amount of property income of Regional and Municipal Governments during 2002 (usually reported as 
current revenues in the Peruvian Accounts system) is assumed to correspond to transfers from canon, sobrecanon 
and royalties. 
Source: MEF and DNCP. 
 
On the other hand, some regional and municipal governments in Peru are entitled to 
sharing in the income tax on certain extractive industries, in the form of the canon, sobrecanon 
and royalties.4
                                                          
4 According to Law 27506, the canon is the share of local and regional governments in the rents and revenues 
obtained by the State from natural resources. The sobrecanon has the same basis as the canon and consists of 
additional sharing of oil revenues that are specific to the regions of Loreto, Ucayali, Piura and Tumbes. The main 
source of royalties is the mining sector. Law 28258 defines mining royalties as a payment to the State for the right to 
exploit mining resources and describes the computation procedure and the distribution criterion.  
 These revenues, which are distributed on an origin basis, increased dramatically 
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between 2004 and 2008 due to the escalating trend of international prices for Peruvian exports of 
natural resources. This resulted in severe geographical fiscal disparities and threatened the 
effectiveness of central government macroeconomic policy. The revenues from canon, 
sobrecanon and royalties represented up to 26.5 percent of total sub-national expenditures and 
2.2 times the amount of sub-national own revenue collections in 2008. Since the central 
authorities are not able by law to alter the amount of these transfers (although they have been 
able to impose certain conditions to their use), we can infer that at any time a fairly volatile 10 
percent of the general government budget can follow policy directions that diverge significantly 
from those designed by the central government. 
In the rest of this section we first take a closer look at the two most sensitive issues 
related to the structure of sub-national financing, transfer dependency and the criteria used to 
distribute revenues from extractive industries, and then we describe in more detail the current 
structure of revenues at the regional and local levels. 
 
2.1 Dependency on Intergovernmental Transfers and the Problem of Vertical Imbalances 
 
The magnitude of intergovernmental transfers is usually associated with the concept and 
measurement of vertical imbalances (or the vertical fiscal gap). Vertical imbalances, roughly 
defined as the “non-correspondence between [own] revenue sources and expenditure 
commitments for each level of government” (Hunter, 1974, p. 481, brackets added), are common 
occurrences even in mature, well-designed and fiscally decentralized systems of government. 
The literature on fiscal federalism has long agreed on the efficiency advantages of sub-national 
governments in certain expenditure decisions (Stigler, 1957; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1968, 
1972), but taxpayers’ mobility and the presence of economies of scale in tax administration and 
enforcement also suggest that it might be efficient to retain some of the most relevant revenue 
sources at the central level (for example, the value added tax—VAT, the corporate income tax, 
or a progressive personal income tax.) An optimal decentralization of expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue sources, therefore, will likely lead to fiscal structures in which the 
central government must provide sub-national governments with transfers to compensate for 
their inability to raise in own revenues all the funds that they need. 
It is difficult to estimate with precision the extent of vertical imbalances. The concept of 
vertical imbalance implicitly requires the definition of standards for each level of government in 
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regard to both the quality of public services provision (leading to the concept of expenditure 
needs) and the ability and effort exerted in the collection of own revenues (leading to the concept 
of fiscal capacity). Expenditure needs can be defined as the amount of public funds required to 
provide public services of a given standard of quality. Fiscal capacity, or own revenue potential, 
can be defined as the amount of revenues that a government or level of governments can collect 
by exerting a given level—for example, average—of fiscal effort. Of course, any adjustment in 
the quality standard of public services or the standard level of effort will affect the size of the 
vertical imbalance.5
In its simplest form, the vertical imbalance for sub-national governments can be defined 
as a ratio of the difference between own revenue and total expenditures to total expenditures. 
Even though the actual amount of transfers will likely differ from the gap between expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity, this measure at least reports the extent to which sub-national 
governments are relying on funding that they do not raise on their own. Moreover, it turns out 
that the degree of dependency on external funding, or the mirroring concept of fiscal autonomy, 
is a central concept in the fiscal decentralization literature. The greater the fiscal autonomy of 
sub-national authorities, the more accountable they would be for their expenditure and revenue 
decisions and the stronger their incentives to behave efficiently.  
 Lacking any better methodology, one might presume that the budgetary 
process implicitly defines the affordable and desired—if not entirely correct—expenditure and 
revenue standards, but this is certainly a strong assumption. Unfortunately, it seems that in 
practice any estimate of vertical imbalances must rely to some extent on current budgetary data.  
In his seminal paper, Hunter (1974) proposed several measures of vertical imbalance 
based on the ability of sub-national governments to influence the amount of revenues and thus 
the level of expenditures. The literature on the measurement of vertical imbalance has grown 
significantly, but it remains closely related with the problem of revenue autonomy. Alternative 
measures of vertical imbalance incorporate adjustments to the basic measure based on the share 
of transfers in total expenditures.6
                                                          
5 Bird and Tarasov (2004) suggest that the vertical imbalance can be considered to be “closed” when the richest 
government at a certain sub-national level is able to fully finance its expenditure responsibilities. Note, however, 
that this notion of vertical imbalance implicitly defines a standard of fiscal capacity (the ability and effort of the 
richest government to collect own-revenues) and also a standard of expenditure needs (equal to actual expenditures 
of the same government). 
  Examples of these adjustments are the amount of transfers 
and lending between levels of sub-national governments, which are mostly irrelevant in the 
6 See Bird and Tarasov (2004) for a review and application of the traditional measures of vertical imbalance and 
Winer and Hettich (2010) for a discussion and extension of the concept. 
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Peruvian case. Because of this reason, the most appropriate measure of vertical imbalance seems 
to be the simple transfers-expenditure ratio. Considering all sub-national governments together 
(regional and local) this measure in Peru is equal to 88.7 percent in 2002 and 87.6 percent in 
2008. We can conclude that, overall, the vertical imbalance or the dependency on transfers has 
remained fairly high and basically unaltered during the decentralization era.7
High dependency on transfers—or an insufficient level of revenue autonomy—is a key 
aspect of the sub-national revenue structure in Peru. Ahmad and Brosio (2004) have argued that 
the small share of own-revenue collections in the sub-national budget has, in general, reduced the 
accountability of sub-national authorities and produced a soft budget constraint problem in Latin 
America. The same diagnosis is applicable to Peru, where Ahmad and García-Escribano (2011) 
have called for the implementation of financing mechanisms that can effectively help to increase 
local accountability.  
 Separating the two 
tiers of sub-national governments, the picture is slightly altered. In particular, during 2008 the 
measure of fiscal imbalance for regional governments is equal to 96.2 percent and for local 
governments 79.4 percent. Of course, the lower vertical imbalance observed at the local level is 
explained by the fact that they are assigned more significant, although still not substantial nor 
sufficiently exploited, own-revenue sources. 
 
2.2 The Distribution of Revenues from Extractive Industries and the Problem 
 of Horizontal Imbalances 
 
Another important issue also framing sub-national revenue mobilization in Peru is the unequal 
distribution of shared revenues from extractive industries on an origin basis, given the location of 
natural resources.  In particular, Law No. 27506  (Law on the  Canon) establishes both the total 
share of sub-national governments on the revenues collected through the income tax on 
extractive industries (which is generally 50 percent), as well as the procedure to compute the 
share that corresponds to each sub-national government.8
                                                          
7 Based on the data in Table 1, these estimates are equal to one minus the share of own and capital revenues over 
total expenditures. 
 Table 2 summarizes this distribution 
8 We focus here only on the distribution procedures for the canon from mining, gas, hydro energy, fishing and 
forestry, which represent 77 percent of total revenues from extractive industries for sub-national governments in 
2008. The distribution of oil canon and sobrecanon (14 percent of sub-national revenues from extractive industries) 
is also based on geographical shares but they vary in each region. The distribution of mining royalties (7 percent of 
regional revenues from extractive industries) is governed by Law No. 28258 of 2004, which defines the same 
beneficiaries and distribution factors but assigns different shares to each beneficiary. For more details about the 
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procedure. The beneficiaries are the districts, provinces or regions where the extraction activities 
take place, and no direct transfer from this revenue source is made to jurisdictions outside those 
geographical areas. 
 
Table 2. Distribution Procedure for Revenues from Canon 
 
Share Beneficiaries Distribution Criteria  
10% District municipalities within which the 
natural resources are exploited 
Equal share 
 
25% Municipalities of the province within which 
the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
40% Municipalities of the region within which 
the natural resources are exploited 
Population and Unmet Basic 
Needs 
25% 80% to Regional Government, and   
20% to the universities in the region 
 
Note: the criteria are applicable to the revenues collected from the exploitation of mining, gas, hydro-energetic, 
fishing and forest resources (excludes oil canon). 
Source: Law No. 27506 (Law on the Canon). 
 
The academic literature and international experience provide no clear guidelines 
regarding the way tax revenues from extractive industries should be allocated, both between the 
central and sub-national governments and among the territories where the exploitation of natural 
resources takes place.9
The distribution of revenues on an origin (also called derivation) basis generally creates 
horizontal imbalances, because the location of natural resources cannot be expected to be 
correlated with the relative expenditure needs or fiscal capacities of the beneficiary governments. 
 In general, more than a matter of economic efficiency, the assignment of 
property rights to natural resources (and their rents) is a problem that each country must solve in 
accordance with peculiar considerations involving political, cultural and even historical 
perspectives. However, it is important to understand and address the economic consequences of 
the assignments at which every country arrives.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
distribution of revenues from extractive industries see, for instance, Gómez, Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda 
(2009b). 
9 See, for example, Bahl (2002) and Searle (2007) for discussions about the problem of distributing revenues from 
extractive industries and reviews of the international experiences. 
11 
 
Even if the distribution criterion is defined according to common determinants of expenditure 
needs like the population and unmet basic needs, as is the case in Peru, the problem of horizontal 
imbalances remains between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.10
 
 Besides the obvious problem 
of inequalities, horizontal imbalances can also create inefficiencies, as they unevenly alter the 
marginal cost of funds face by different government units (Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda, 
2011). Moreover, both inequalities and inefficiencies can be expected to increase with the 
amount of transfers distributed. This is a critical issue in Peru, where transfers from extractive 
industries represent around a quarter of total sub-national expenditures, and where there are 
currently no effective compensating mechanisms to reduce the distortions imposed by the 
system. 
2.3 Revenue Structure at the Regional Level 
 
The current situation with revenue assignments and mobilization is starkly different for regional 
and local governments. Even though regional governments have been given additional 
responsibilities, they have not yet been assigned any tax revenue source, and thus their revenue 
autonomy is negligible and includes only some charges and fees. Table 3 presents the 
composition of regional revenues during 2004, 2006 and 2008. Transfers have historically been 
the main revenue source for regional governments, remaining over 95 percent of total revenues 
during the period. The most important source of transfers to regional governments is, by far, 
transfers from “ordinary resources,” which represent more than two-thirds of total regional 
revenues in 2008. The distribution of ordinary resources to regional governments is based on 
historical costs of regional expenditure functions, although they are also subject to upward 
corrections upon request to the central authorities and upon availability of resources after 
primary budgetary assignments. Ordinary resources include salaries, pensions, goods and 
services, donations and other expenses, which are mainly devoted to “de-concentrated” functions 
in education and health. The large share of ordinary resources in regional revenues is, therefore, 
related with the fact that regional governments are not given much expenditure autonomy, such 
that the decentralization process at the regional level is still in a very early stage. 
 
                                                          
10 The index of unmet basic needs is defined as the percentage of the population with at least one basic need that has 
not been satisfied. The basic needs considered in the index are electricity, water and sewage services. 
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Table 3. Composition of Regional Revenues, 2004, 2006 and 2008 
(in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of current and capital revenues) 
 
 2004 % 2006 % 2008 % 
       
Own revenues 303 4.1 421 4.1 632 4.7 
Taxes and contributions 2 0.0 13 0.1 13 0.1 
Charges and fees 160 2.2 199 1.9 217 1.6 
Other 141 1.9 209 2.0 402 3.0 
       
Transfers 7,096 95.8 9,882 95.7 12,803 95.2 
Ordinary resources 6,027 81.3 7,857 76.1 9,094 67.6 
Canon, sobrecanon and royalties 350 4.7 956 9.3 1,669 12.4 
Mining Canon 107 1.4 441 4.3 970 7.2 
Oil canon and sobrecanon 189 2.6 281 2.7 365 2.7 
Gas canon 18 0.2 99 1.0 188 1.4 
Other canon and royalties 36 0.5 136 1.3 146 1.1 
Custom duties 78 1.1 112 1.1 153 1.1 
     FONCOR 360 4.9 430 4.2 674 5.0 
     Others 281 3.8 527 5.1 1,213 9.0 
       
Current Revenues 7,399 99.9 10,303 99.8 13,435 99.9 
Capital revenues 11 0.1 25 0.2 14 0.1 
       
Current and capital revenues 7,410 100.0 10,328 100.0 13,449 100.0 
       
Source: MEF and DNCP. 
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The second most important source of transfers in 2008 is from extractive industries 
(canon, sobrecanon and royalties), which represents more than 12 percent of total regional 
revenues.11
To get an idea of their variability, in Table 4 we present the basic statistics for the 
distribution of transfers from extractive industries and the FONCOR across regional 
governments for 2004 and 2008. In 2004 the amounts of revenue distributed from both sources 
were quite similar, but the maximum per capita transfers from extractive industries 
(corresponding to the region of Loreto) was almost double the maximum amount provided by the 
FONCOR (to the region of Moquegua). The greater concentration of revenues from extractive 
industries in fewer regional governments is confirmed by the two measures of variability, the 
coefficient of variation and the range between minimum and maximum per capita transfers over 
the (weighted) average, which are much higher for this source of revenues. Similar results are 
obtained for the year 2008, but the differences between the maximum per capita revenues and the 
variability are even more acute. Tacna, a region rich in mining resources, received four times 
more revenues from the canon than Apurimac, the region most benefited by the FONCOR. 
 The FONCOR, the equalization transfer program at the regional level, is also a 
significant revenue source, but in 2008 it contributed less than half of the revenues coming from 
the canon, sobrecanon and royalties. However, note that in 2004 before the rapid increase in the 
international prices of natural resources preceding the global financial crisis, the revenues 
coming from the canon, sobrecanon and royalties and those from FONCOR were roughly 
equivalent. In all, the relative importance of revenues from extractive industries increased 
significantly during the period as long as the rising trend of international prices of Peruvian 
exports persisted.  
The FONCOR is distributed according to population, a measure of unmet basic needs, 
location (population close to the border), and effectiveness in the execution of the investment 
budget. Even though these transfers are meant to be used only for capital investment purposes 
and related expenses, the potential fungibility of money within budgets is likely to allow, at least 
in principle, for a fairly effective equalizing effect. However, the greater magnitude and 
variability of revenues from extractive industries with respect to the FONCOR suggests that the 
equalizing potential of the latter may be significantly limited. Moreover, provided that the 
                                                          
11 Taxes and contributions consist exclusively of import duties collected by Tacna.  
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FONCOR considers factors that are related to expenditure needs, the fact that the correlation 
between the two revenue sources was close to zero in 2004 implies that the revenues from 
extractive industries are independent from expenditure needs, while the greater negative 
correlation observed in 2008 suggests that they have actually moved in opposite directions. 
 
Table 4. Variability of Regional Revenues from Extractive Industries and FONCOR, 
2004 and 2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 
 2004 2008 
 
Extractive 
industries 
FONCOR 
Extractive 
industries 
FONCOR 
     
minimum 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.4 
maximum 118.4 65.4 647.3 134.3 
     (region) (Loreto) (Moquegua) (Tacna) (Apurimac) 
     
simple average 21.3 24.5 101.0 43.1 
weighted average 13.3 13.7 60.0 24.2 
standard deviation 32.3 18.0 153.5 39.5 
coefficient of variation (*) 2.4 1.3 2.6 1.6 
(max - min)/average 8.9 4.7 10.8 5.5 
     
correlation: -0.02 -0.28 
     
(*) The coefficient of variation is equal to the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MEF data. 
 
In 2009, through Ministerial Resolution No. 322-2009-EF-15, the General Directorate of 
Economic and Social Affairs (DGAES) introduced a new methodology to compute FONCOR 
transfers, which should significantly improve their equalizing power. Under the new 
methodology, the aforementioned factors are used to compute the capital expenditure needs of 
each regional government, and then the net capital expenditure needs are obtained by subtracting 
from this amount the revenues received from canon, sobrecanon, royalties and customs duties. 
Finally, the transfer is distributed proportionally among regional governments with positive net 
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capital expenditure needs. As a result, governments for which the revenues from extractive 
industries exceed their capital expenditure needs receive no transfers from the FONCOR, and the 
available resources can be concentrated exclusively on the regions where there is insufficient 
funding for capital expenditures.12
This reform was designed to be implemented gradually during a period of three years, 
and provides a suggestive mechanism for reducing the distortions imposed by the revenues from 
extractive industries and enhancing equity and efficiency in the system of sub-national 
government finances in Peru. Indeed, what this reform has done is simply to introduce into the 
equalization transfer formula an adjustment for the revenues obtained from natural resources, 
which is one of the most important components of sub-national fiscal capacity in Peru.
 
13
 
 As we 
will see below, the municipal equalization transfer, the FONCOMUN, still lacks an equivalent 
adjustment to account for revenues from natural resources. Ideally, in the future both the 
FONCOR and FONCOMUN will take into account other determinants of fiscal capacity beyond 
natural resources. 
2.4 Revenue Structure at the Municipal Level 
 
Decree Law No. 776 defines the revenue sources for municipal governments in Peru. In 
particular, it establishes taxes on property as the main tax revenue sources for provincial and 
district municipalities. Provinces are assigned the tax on vehicle property, and districts are 
assigned the tax on land and buildings and the tax on property transfers. Table 5 summarizes the 
composition of current revenues at the municipal level in Peru. Even though municipalities enjoy 
a certain degree of tax autonomy that is absent at the regional level, the revenues actually 
collected from these sources are not especially relevant. As an indication of this, note that total 
own tax collections have been historically lower than the sum of charges and fees, which include 
street cleaning, road tolls, parks maintenance, public safety services and construction permits.   
High dependency on intergovernmental transfers is also an important concern at the local 
level. Overall, transfers represent 75 percent of the municipal budget in 2008, with the transfer 
                                                          
12 The current weights for the distribution factors are 51 percent for population, 43 percent for unmet basic needs, 3 
percent for border population and 3 percent for effectiveness in investment budget execution. Even though the latter 
two factors might not be good determinants of expenditure needs, they only account for 6 percent of the 
computation, leaving 94 percent to population and unmet basic needs, which are more adequate proxies for needs. 
13 Gómez, Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda (2009a, 2009b) propose and illustrate this type of adjustment for 
FONCOMUN and FONCOR in Peru. 
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revenues from extractive industries and the municipal compensation transfer fund 
(FONCOMUN) being the two most important sources, representing around 40 and 25 percent of 
sub-national revenues, respectively, in 2008.  
 
Table 5. Composition of Current Revenues at the Municipal Level in 2004, 2006 and 2008 
(in millions of nuevos soles, and percent shares of current revenues) 
 
 2004 % 2006 % 2008 % 
       
Taxes 638 11.1 720 9.6 1,296 9.9 
     Property 532 9.3 627 8.4 1,130 8.6 
          Vehicle property 61 1.1 57 0.8 95 0.7 
          Property (land and buildings) 407 7.1 462 6.2 615 4.7 
          Property transfer (alcabala) 64 1.1 108 1.4 421 3.2 
     Others 106 1.8 93 1.2 166 1.3 
       
Other own revenues 1,441 25.1 1,407 18.8 1,963 15.0 
     Charges and fees 1,032 18.0 1,010 13.5 1,336 10.2 
     Others 409 7.1 396 5.3 627 4.8 
       
Transfers 3,670 63.8 5,369 71.6 9,813 75.1 
     Canon, Sobrecanon and Royalties 705 12.3 2,428 32.4 5,145 39.4 
          Mining canon 324 5.6 1,248 16.6 3,341 25.6 
          Mining royalties 0 0.0 299 4.0 401 3.1 
          Oil canon and sobrecanon 220 3.8 381 5.1 579 4.4 
          Gas canon 54 0.9 297 4.0 546 4.2 
          Other canon and royalties 107 1.9 203 2.7 277 2.1 
     FONCOMUN 1,729 30.1 2,323 31.0 3,257 24.9 
     Others 1,236 21.5 618 8.2 1,411 10.8 
       
Current revenues 5,749 100.0 7,495 100.0 13,073 100.0 
       
Source: MEF and DNCP. 
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Decree Law No. 776 also establishes the tax rates to be applied in each case and the 
sharing of collections between provinces and districts. A summary of these regulations is 
presented in Table 6. From that information it is clear that local governments in Peru are given 
no autonomy either to define their tax bases or set the rates for the taxes assigned them. All these 
decisions are determined centrally. Therefore, the local choice about how much to collect is 
confined to the realm of tax administration and enforcement efforts. 
The lack of autonomy to define local tax policy is not, however, the only important 
obstacle to local revenue mobilization in Peru. For instance, tax morale and the attitudes of 
government officials may play a relevant role in limiting the amount of tax revenue collections. 
According to Alfaro and Rühling (2007), a substantial share of Peru’s population still does not 
appear to fully understand, or does not accept, its supporting role in the financing of the local 
public goods and services they receive, while some local authorities accept, rather passively, the 
fundamentally voluntary contributions of taxpayers. 
In addition, many municipalities, especially those in rural areas, do not have the 
administrative and technical capacity to collect significant amounts of tax revenues. For 
example, a significant number of local governments do not have a complete cadastre of 
properties, and the existing cadastres are not regularly updated (Alfaro and Rühling, 2007). 
Although widely recommended as a source of local own revenues, the collection of the property 
tax is in practice very difficult and expensive.14
                                                          
14 There is an extensive literature supporting the assignment of the property tax to local governments. See Oates 
(1999) and Bahl, Martínez-Vázquez and Youngman (2008, 2010) for discussions about the advantages and 
disadvantages of local property taxation. 
 Martínez-Vázquez, Noiset and Rider (2010) 
review international practices in the decentralization of the property tax and show that the central 
government plays a significant role in the administration of this revenue source in many 
countries. The difficulties in administrating and collecting the property tax sometimes make the 
involvement of the central government an advisable strategy for improving performance in some 
of the most cumbersome tasks, especially in developing countries like Peru. In a group of 75 
countries at different stages of development (among which only 13 countries do not accrue the 
revenues of the property tax to sub-national governments), Martínez-Vázquez, Noiset and Rider 
(2010) observe that the central government is (exclusively) assigned the registration of properties 
in 44 percent of cases, and carries out the billing and collection of the tax in 24 percent of the 
countries in the sample. The responsibilities of the central government in the administration of 
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the property tax are found to be greater in developing countries than in developed countries, but 
the difference is not substantial. Greater differences are found in the authority to determine tax 
rates; the central government has exclusive power to determine the tax rate in 14 of the 37 
developing countries in the sample, but the same is true for only 3 of 38 developed countries 
considered. In this context Peru is one of the few cases where the central government does not 
provide assistance in administering the property and where decision-making authority does not 
incentivize greater revenue autonomy. 
 
Table 6. Main Characteristics of Municipal Tax Revenue Assignments 
 
 Revenue shares Tax rates 
 Districts Provinces  
District administration:    
Land and buildings 
100% (5% for  
cadastre 
maintenance) 
0% 
< 15 UIT:  
15-60 UIT:  
> 60 UIT: 
0.2% (or 
0.6%) 
0.6% 
1.0% 
Property transfers 
(alcabala) 
50% 
50% (to Municipal 
Investment Fund) 
 3% (first 3 UIT exempted) 
(*) 
Games (pinball, bingo, etc) 100% 0% 10% 
Public shows 100% 0% 
Bullfighting: 
Horse racing: 
Others: 
  5% 
10% 
15% 
    
Provincial administration:    
Vehicle property 0% 100% 1% (minimum: 1.5% UIT) 
Bets 40% 60% 20% (horse rising: 12%) 
Games (lotteries) 0% 100% 10% 
    
Source: Gómez, Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda (2010), based on Decree Law No. 677. 
Notes : (*) UIT (Unidad Impositiva Tributaria) or “Tributary Tax Unit” is a monetary measure used to set the value 
of taxes, fees, penalties and other legal payments equivalent to 3,600 nuevos soles (US$1,283 on December 31, 
2010), in 2010. The value of the UIT for 2011 is the same than in 2010.  
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All these factors seem to be contributing to the poor tax revenue mobilization 
performance of Peruvian municipalities, which perform far below international standards. Table 
7 shows the productivity of the property tax for a number of selected regions of the world and for 
Latin American countries. The OECD countries appear to be the ones taking the most advantage 
of this revenue source, as their ratio of property tax collections over GDP is more than 2 percent 
in the period 2000-2004. It is true that the property tax base can be expected to be greater in 
developed countries, but the productivity of the property tax in Peru, 0.17 percent of the GDP, is 
low even when compared to similar countries in Latin America, which on average collect almost 
three times as much as Peru. In the region, only Ecuador and Guatemala exhibit lower property 
tax performance than Peru. This low productivity might be partially explained by the tax rates 
applied in the country. De Cesare and Lazo Marín (2008) provide information about property tax 
rates in a sample of eight Latin American countries. In this group only Guatemala and Costa 
Rica have tax rates as low as Peru,15
Similar international comparisons for other own revenue sources would help to evaluate 
the revenue collection performance of sub-national governments in Peru, as well as identify other 
reasons why that performance might deviate from international standards. Unfortunately, the 
available information and published literature on sub-national revenue sources other than the 
property tax are scarce, and we are not able at this point to perform an evaluation of revenue 
effort and performance of other local revenue sources. In any case, we might presume that the 
problems found for the property tax, the most important own revenue source for sub-national 
governments in Peru, is at least indicative of the problems that we might find for other own 
revenue sources.  
 while the rest impose either higher minimum (or flat) rates 
(Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Dominican Republic) or higher maximum rates (Bolivia). 
 
                                                          
15 Guatemala also has a progressive property tax schedule, with a minimum rate of 0.2 percent (the same as Peru), 
and a maximum rate of 0.9 percent, slightly lower than the 1.0 percent applied in Peru. In contrast, Costa Rica 
applies a single tax rate of 0.25 percent. 
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Table 7. Property Tax Collections as a Percentage of GDP, 
Selected Regions and Countries, 1990-2007 
 
International averages (*) 
 
  Selected Latin American countries 
 
 1990-1999 2000-2004    1990-1999 2000-2007 
        
All countries 0.75 (59) 1.04 (65)   Argentina 0.63 0.53 
OECD countries 1.44 (16) 2.12 (18)   Bolivia … 0.65 
Transition countries 0.54 (20) 0.68 (18)   Brazil 0.32 0.43 
Developing 
countries 
0.42 (23) 0.60 (29)   Chile 0.60 0.66 
Latin America 0.36 (8) 0.37 (10)   Colombia 0.36 0.50 
     Ecuador 0.12 0.13 
     Guatemala 0.08 0.14 
     Mexico 0.18 0.18 
     Paraguay 0.36 0.39 
     Peru … 0.17 
     Uruguay 0.61 0.71 
        
(*)Parentheses display the number of countries considered in each sample average.  
Sources: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and ECLAC (2009). 
 
Even though revenue collection performance is, in general, poor among local 
governments in Peru, there are also successful experiences in which administrative reforms have 
led to substantial increases in municipal revenue collections. Maybe the most notable example is 
the implementation of semi-autonomous offices in nine provincial municipalities.16
                                                          
16 The provincial municipalities are Lima, Trujillo, Piura, Huancayo, Cajamarca, Chiclayo, Ica, Tarapoto and 
Huamanga. 
 Tax 
Administration Service offices were created by these governments with the exclusive purpose of 
administering and collecting tax and non-tax revenues within their jurisdictions, and thus far 
have provided very positive results in terms of administrative efficiency and taxpayer 
compliance (see Box 1). There are reasons to believe that this is not a solution that would work 
for all municipalities, as only few provincial (or relatively large) municipalities have 
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implemented the system. However, there might also be useful lessons for smaller municipalities 
that could be extracted from the experience. 
 
Box 1. The Experience with Tax Administration Services in Peru 
 
 
Overall, we can conclude that, even though local governments in Peru are assigned taxing 
powers that are absent at the regional level, with few but important exceptions local governments 
have made little use of them. Thus, the intergovernmental system of finance in Peru would seem 
to be at an early stage of the revenue decentralization process, largely deprived of this important 
mechanism for increasing accountability and efficient behavior among local officials. The next 
section attempts to explain the performance of local governments.  
Since 1996 some Peruvian municipalities have created a semi-autonomous Tax Administration 
Service (SAT in Spanish). The main objective of this offices is to increase own revenues. As 
stated by Von Haldenwang et. al. (2009), the establishment of SAT, in its beginning was a 
response to the centralization that Alberto Fujimori’s Government (1990-2000) pushed. 
However, more recent SAT creations have been implemented in a slow and still inconclusive 
decentralization process. While the SAT is autonomous in its financial and human resource 
management and it is financed through a share of the taxes and fees commissions it collects, 
local authorities are still responsible for regulating and controlling its work. This self-financing 
structure has led SATs to be more efficient in terms of revenue collection, as the more revenue 
they collect the higher are the sources they have. There have been some clear benefits for those 
Peruvian municipalities that, like Lima, Trujillo and Piura, adopted a SAT approach at the 
beginning. For example, those municipalities that adopted a SAT increased their own revenue 
by 80.9 percent, or 9 annually on average, from 1998 to 2007; by comparison, over the same 
period the municipalities that did not adopt a SAT saw their revenues increase by 61.2 percent, 
or 6.8 percent annually.  Von Haldenwang et. al. (2009) show that trust in tax administration in 
Lima and other municipalities where an SAT was adopted has increased. This could be 
attributed to lower political intervention in administrative processes, higher client focus 
management, improved public relations, and a reduction of corrupt practices. SATs are very 
independent in terms of their financial and investment structure, internal organization and 
human resource management. But not all has been kudos for the new local tax administration. 
The same empirical survey studies identify several issues associated with SATs: a limited link 
between revenue collection and public services and the public perception of tax administration 
as “insensitive.” But some of this is to be expected since the SATs have gone against previous 
conventions and taken advantage of poorly defined rules, especially in the SAT of Lima. One 
of the key characteristics of SAT agencies has been their drive to innovation in including 
internal processes, the use of modern technologies, human resource development, improved 
financial management, and collaboration across tax administrations. 
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3. The Determinants of Own Revenue Collections in Local Governments   
 
Even though the overall revenue performance of local governments is poor, there are significant 
exceptions. It is therefore important to identify possible determinants of differences in 
performance and take them into account when designing proposals for reforms.  
A starting point is the incentives provided by the current institutional set-up to local 
revenue mobilization. In this regard, the decentralization literature has given special importance 
to the potential effect of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local tax effort.17 There are several 
possible links between the transfer system and the problem of revenue mobilization. For sub-
national governments, intergovernmental transfers might be perceived as a costless revenue 
source, while the costs (political and economic) of raising the same amount of revenues on their 
own can be quite substantial. And although all sub-national governments are likely to receive 
transfers, not all of them receive the same transfers or in the same amount. This implies that 
different revenue structures are associated with different marginal costs, and that consequently 
the wrong amounts of transfers can induce inefficient tax and expenditure decisions by sub-
national governments (Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda, 2011).18
In fact, the empirical literature analyzing the effect of intergovernmental transfers on own 
revenue collections and tax effort is quite large. In line with findings for other countries, the 
results for the Peruvian case are ambiguous. Based on an exploratory analysis, Rühling (2005) 
argues that intergovernmental transfers did not reduce property tax collections during the period 
2000-2003, but he does not provide statistical evidence for that claim. Other studies using 
econometric analyses find a positive impact of transfers on revenue collections. Aguilar and 
Morales (2005) find positive but differentiated effects by department, while Melgarejo and 
Rabanal (2006) find a positive effect that seems to vanish when the revenues from canon and 
sobrecanon are included in total transfers. Contrary to these findings, Alvarado et al. (2003) and 
Aragón and Gayoso (2005) argue that that the total amount of transfers has reduced own revenue 
  
                                                          
17 For a discussion see Bahl and Cyan (2010). 
18 In this respect, the literature on the flypaper effect provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
intergovernmental transfers reduce the perceived marginal costs of funds of the recipient government and 
consequently have a positive effect on sub-national expenditures. The flypaper effect refers to an empirical 
regularity by which the transfers received by the governments induce a greater expansion of public expenditures 
than an equal amount of transfers to individuals in the same jurisdictions. The literature about the flypaper effect is 
extensive; for general reviews see, for instance, Hines and Thaler (1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1998). 
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collections in Peru.19 In a more recent study, Sepúlveda and Martínez-Vázquez (2011) find some 
evidence of substitution between the funds received from FONCOMUN and property tax 
collections in Peru.20
Although the general intuitive argument is for transfers to crowd out own local revenues, 
there are also a number of reasons why transfers might have a positive effect on revenue 
collections. For example, the funds received from transfers can be used to improve tax 
administration and enforcement procedures or to change the conditions that help determine tax 
compliance and demand for public goods. Transfers may also have the effect of helping develop 
the local economy and therefore improve local tax bases; thus, even if local tax effort is reduced 
as a consequence of the substitution effect of transfers, tax collections may go up as a result of 
the income or development effect of those transfers. Overall, theory is not conclusive about what 
the size of the final effect should be, and the empirical evidence suggests that it could go either 
way. 
  
There are other factors that may affect the revenue performance of sub-national 
governments. In particular, administrative capacity may be an important constraint even for 
willing local governments. The real estate property tax, currently administered by districts, is 
generally difficult to administer properly; it requires both a considerable degree of sophistication 
and qualified personnel in its different phases of cadastre building, property assessment, billing 
and enforcement. On the other hand, the vehicle tax, currently administered by provinces, is 
generally easier to collect and requires less administrative capability. This situation suggests that 
a better match between administrative requirements and capabilities could be obtained by 
switching the vehicle tax to the district level and the property tax to the provincial level.21
Given the very different sizes and administrative capacity of district municipalities in 
Peru, we would anticipate on this ground quite different performances in revenue collections. In 
addition, we should expect that revenue mobilization performance of sub-national governments 
will be affected by their level of economic development and, of course, the size of their tax 
  
                                                          
19 Aragón and Gayoso (2005) use FONCOMUN transfers as an instrument as they argue that the relation between 
transfers and revenue is guided through poverty, causing endogeneity problems; however, the design of the canon 
does not include a poverty component.  
20 The same authors also find evidence of the substitution effect for Brazil and for a panel of Latin American 
countries. 
21 We performed a simulation of the effects of switching the assignments of the two taxes between provinces and 
districts, which can be found in Appendix 2. Unfortunately, this measure would result in a great loss of fiscal 
autonomy at the district level and an intensification of current disparities at the local level. 
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bases. For example, urban municipalities with some concentration of industrial and service 
activity generally provide easier bases for raising local revenues. Finally, differentiated political 
and political economy factors may affect revenue mobilization performance. For all sub-national 
units, we may expect collection enforcement efforts to decline prior to elections. Revenue 
performance may also be lower in sub-national units with higher levels of local-elite capture.  
 
3.1 What Do the Data Tell Us For the Case of Peru?  
 
In order to identify the determinants of revenue collection performance in Peru, we use National 
Public Accounts data on 192 provinces and 1,630 districts for the years 2006-2008. We complete 
the dataset with information from the National Census 2007, the National Institute of Statistics 
and Information (INEI), the National Registry of Municipalities (INEI-RENAMU) and Llempén, 
Morón and Seminario (2010). Following the existing literature on this issue, we use total own 
revenue and total tax revenue in per capita terms as the dependent variables. To test the effect of 
transfers on revenue mobilization we use alternative measures of transfers: total transfers and the 
two main aggregates of local transfers in Peru, revenues from extractive industries and the 
FONCOMUN separately. We also run regressions for the aggregate local level and for district 
and provincial municipalities separately.  
In order to control for the tax base of the Peruvian municipalities we consider district and 
provincial-level information comprising the distribution of population by age cohorts, poverty, 
and area; the poverty headcount index;22 illiteracy; population; GDP per capita;23 population 
working in agriculture; the employment ratio; and dummies for the region in order to capture 
asymmetries among regions, as argued by Aguilar and Morales (2005).24
                                                          
22 Contrary to previous findings we employ the poverty line headcount index as it provides a better measure of 
cyclical poverty. In addition, this variable provides a better measure of the purchasing power of the population. 
Nevertheless, the correlation of this measure with the index of Unmet Basic Needs is very high, reaching a value of 
0.7.  
 In addition, to capture 
the “explosion” of transfers over time we include a set of year and regional dummies for the 
period of analysis. For the actual estimation we use a set of panel data models, given their 
flexibility in capturing overtime behavior (many times unobservable) of the agents 
(municipalities). However, given that the dependent variable exhibits a high proportion of 0 
23 Given the lack of official measures of local GDP we use the estimates developed by Llempén, Morón and 
Seminario (2010).  
24 There is some correlation between some of these variables; however it does not impair the estimation other than 
producing underestimation of the effects. In addition, for the second set of regressions—the potential estimation—
collinearity is not relevant as there we are just trying to predict values.   
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values this could produce biased and inconsistent estimators and, as suggested by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005), a censored panel needs to be implemented. In addition, we test the same 
specifications excluding the 0 values and estimate a random effects panel model.25
As a proxy to capture administrative capacity of the municipalities we use the proportion 
of skilled local government workers (managerial and professional) with respect to total workers 
in the local government. The results for this variable indicate that municipalities with better 
human capital tend to perform worse in terms of revenue collection. However, the estimated 
coefficients are not statistically significant (see Table A1).
  
26
The controls of revenue employed behave, to some extent, as expected. Local 
governments with higher poverty levels (measured by the headcount index) show lower per 
capita revenue collection. We find a positive (yet sometimes insignificant) effect of per capita 
GDP, indicating that richer local governments would tend to be able to collect more revenue per 
capita (see Table A2). To a large extent the latter variable directly captures fiscal capacity 
characteristics, which help to estimate the relative size of the tax base, and indirectly captures 
some aspects of the administrative capacity of Peruvian local governments. Therefore 
municipalities with larger tax bases and better administrative capacity would be able to collect 
more revenues.  
 In line with the results of Aguilar 
and Morales (2005), we find differential effects across regions. Highly urbanized areas such as 
Lima and Callao present positive and significant results, while smaller regions (e.g., Piura and 
Pasco) show insignificant negative effects. 
We also include the percentage of agricultural workers as a total of the working 
population to capture on one hand the degree of urbanization, and on the other hand the presence 
of skilled human capital in the jurisdiction. The results show a strongly negative effect, 
indicating that municipalities with higher levels of agricultural workers present lower levels of 
revenue and tax collection; these results also show the expected result that urban areas are able to 
mobilize higher revenues, supposedly because of better administrative capacity but also because 
of larger tax bases. We find a positive and significant effect of population on property tax 
                                                          
25 We apply panel data Tobit estimation for the censored model, and a random effects estimator due to the inclusion 
of time-invariant controls in the econometric model.  
26 We also considered a dummy representing the existence of a cadastre as a proxy for administrative capacity, but 
the results remained insignificant. We should note that the quality of the information used to construct this variable 
and other institutional capacity variables is not good. Therefore the results should be interpreted with caution, since 
the poor quality of the data is likely to affect the consistency of the estimated coefficients. 
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collection, indicating the possible existence of economies of scale in collections. However, these 
results tend to disappear as we concentrate on the definition of the dependent variable based on 
own tax collections and own revenue collections.  
Because of the large number of equations and estimated coefficients, in Table 8 we 
present only the results of the effects of per capita transfers on own revenues and own tax 
revenues per capita for our preferred specifications. Note that each cell in the table comes from a 
single and independent estimation.   
The results in Table 8 show for the most part a positive relation between transfers and 
total own revenue collections, with the only exception, although not consistent, of FONCOMUN 
transfers. In contrast, the effect of total transfers on total own revenue collections is positive and 
robust (for all specifications) for the group of all municipalities and the subgroups of district and 
provincial municipalities. However, from the results obtained from separating among own tax 
revenues and own non-tax revenues, it would appear that the effect of total transfers on total own 
revenue collections is dominated by the behavior of non-tax revenues.  
An increase of one nuevo sol in transfers per capita would have a positive increase on the 
total own revenue collection by 0.03 nuevo sol. The positive effect goes in line with the results 
presented by Aguilar and Morales (2005) and Melgarejo and Rabanal (2006) and discussed 
above. However, we do find a negative effect of transfers from the FONCOMUN on total own 
revenues in the Tobit estimates. The negative result for FONCOMUN transfers holds for the 
combined sample of districts and provinces and for districts only. These results are in line with 
the ones found by Sepúlveda and Martínez-Vazquez (2011). However, the coefficient for 
FONCOMUN transfers becomes positive for the subsample of only provincial municipalities.  
As for own tax revenue collections, the results are not as strong as for total own revenues. 
We find a small positive effect of total transfers on own tax revenue collection in all different 
specifications, and a small negative although insignificant effect in the case of transfers from 
extractive industries. However, note that the negative and strong effect of the FONCOMUN 
remains present when considering Tobit estimates. 
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Table 8.  Selected Regression Results for the Effect of Transfers on Revenue Mobilization 
 Random effects estimations 
  
Tobit estimations 
 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Total District Provincial   Total District Provincial 
        
Total Own Revenue 
Per Capita 
       
Total transfers per 
capita 0.0326*** 0.0330*** 0.0320***   0.0325*** 0.0328*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0035)  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0032) 
Extractive industries 
per capita 0.0327*** 0.0331*** 0.0321***  0.0326*** 0.0331*** 0.0317*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0035)  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0032) 
FONCOMUN per 
capita -0.017 -0.0562 0.1725  -0.022* -0.0606** 0.1728** 
  (0.0330) (0.0354) (0.1023)   (0.0123) (0.0206) (0.0655) 
        
Total Tax Revenue 
Per Capita        
Total Transfers per 
Capita 0.0003 0.0002 0.0016*   0.0001 0.0001* 0.0015 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008)  (0.0001) 0.0000  (0.0016) 
Extractive industries 
per Capita -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0015*  -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0014 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)  (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
FONCOMUN per 
Capita 0.0165 0.0039 0.0045  -0.0446*** -0.0649*** -0.0108** 
  (0.0256) (0.0296) (0.0240)   (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0054) 
        
Total Non-Tax 
Revenue Per Capita        
Total Transfers per 
Capita 0.0336*** 0.0350*** 0.0305***   0.0335*** 0.0347*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0033)  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0022) 
Extractive industries 
per Capita 0.0340*** 0.0356*** 0.0308***  0.0340*** 0.0354*** 0.0303*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0032)  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0023) 
FONCOMUN per 
Capita -0.0034 -0.0291 0.1687  -0.0092 -0.0355* 0.1714*** 
  (0.0283) (0.0309) (0.0899)   (0.0155) (0.0167) (0.0474) 
        
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * 10% ** 5% ***1% significance level. Each cell represents one independent 
regression with a set of controls (age groups, area, poverty headcount index, population, illiteracy, population, GDP, 
population working in agriculture, employment ratio and dummies for region and year). 
 
28 
 
Summarizing the results, transfers from extractive industries appear to have a positive 
effect on the level of revenue collections, and particularly on the non-tax component of revenue 
collections. The causes of this relationship are not evident, but we can speculate that it might be 
related to a greater capacity of sub-national governments to provide public services and charge 
for them, with greater demand for these services, and/or with greater ability to pay on the part of 
the population. All of these are plausible consequences of an increase in the funds available in 
local jurisdictions due to additional transfers from extractive industries. In contrast, revenues 
from extractive industries seem to have little or no effect on municipal tax collections, as most 
relevant coefficients are economically and statistically insignificant.  
Finally, the effect of the FONCOMUN on revenue collections is negatively statistically 
significant, particularly in the case of tax revenues and under the Tobit estimations. This means 
that the substitution effect of this source of revenues is greater than the positive income effects, 
and that overall the equalization transfers may be discouraging local tax collections. This is an 
interesting result that is in line with our expectations. 
In sum, in this paper we advance on the current estimations of tax effort in Peru, not only 
by considering a wider range of econometric methodologies to account for potential biases, but 
also by distinguishing between provinces and districts, between tax and non-tax revenues, and by 
incorporating a wide range of control variables in the analysis. For instance, we tested different 
administrative capacity variables such as cadastral records by municipalities or skills of the 
authorities, along with several other structural variables that aim to capture the tax base of the 
municipalities. Although we did not find a significant effect of the administrative capacity 
proxies that we use, we did find significant effects of variables that aim to capture tax base, such 
as GDP or poverty.  Overall, we do not have a very strong story to tell on the impact of transfers 
on the general poor performance in revenue mobilization of Peru’s municipalities, but we believe 
that future research might gain much by incorporating into the analysis better proxies for 
administrative capacity and other variables such as institutional development, tax morale and 
corruption.   
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4.  The Municipal Compensation Fund and Other Transfers to Local    
Governments  
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that, in order to understand municipal 
governments’ tax collection behavior, it is necessary to examine the transfers local governments 
receive from both FONCOMUN and extractive industries.  
 The Municipal Compensation Fund (FONCOMUN) is a conventional equalization 
transfer program, established in 1994 by Legislative Decree No. 776 (Law of Municipal 
Taxation). The FONCOMUN is financed with the municipal promotion tax (impuesto de 
promoción municipal), which consists of a rate of up to 2 percent applied over the value added 
tax, plus other minor revenue sources. According to the 1994 Law, the distribution of the 
FONCOMUN should be based on equity and compensation criteria, and the transfer should 
ensure the functioning of all municipalities. More recently, Law 29332 of 2009 and Supreme 
Decree 060-2010 introduced “managerial performance” as an additional criterion in the 
distribution formula. 
Box 2 summarizes the procedure currently used to distribute the available FONCOMUN 
funds among municipalities. In the first stage, the transfer fund is allocated to the provinces in 
proportion to their unmet basic needs weighted by their population. In the second stage, 
provinces keep 20 percent of the funds. The remaining 80 percent is distributed among the each 
province’s district governments in accordance with three factors: population, managerial 
performance, and land area. The most important of these factors is population, with a weight of 
85 percent, where rural population is assumed to have twice the expenditure needs of urban 
population. The next factor in importance is managerial performance, which is defined in terms 
of the rate growth of per capita own revenue collections and the share of transfers from 
FONCOMUN that is spent on capital expenditures. In the final stage, the amounts of transfers 
are adjusted so that all municipalities receive at least a minimum transfer equivalent to eight 
monthly UITs.27
 
  
                                                          
27 The UIT is a legal monetary unit whose value has been set to 3,600 nuevos soles since 2010 (US$1,283 at 
December 31, 2010)  
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Box 2. The Distribution of the FONCOMUN 
 
 
The FONCOMUN is an important component of municipal revenues in Peru in terms of 
its relative magnitude as well as its compensating function. However, certain aspects of its 
design can still be improved. A first criticism is that the system considers a certain 
approximation of expenditure needs but does not offer any adjustment due to fiscal capacity of 
municipal governments. Consequently, under the current system all municipalities, even those 
that already have abundant fiscal resources, receive transfers of a certain amount. Those 
resources could have a much more equalizing effect if they were used to support those 
municipalities with low fiscal capacity. The same argument serves to identify a second criticism 
of the current distribution procedure. If some municipalities already have sufficient fiscal 
capacity to finance their expenditure needs, then the minimum transfer they receive could be 
used with a greater equalizing effect if those funds could be allocated to municipalities with 
lower fiscal capacity. A third criticism is that allocation in two stages, first to the province and 
later to the districts, can result in undesirable changes in the final allocations to the districts. To 
see this, think about two identical districts that belong to different provinces; depending on the 
provinces’ characteristics they will likely receive different per capita transfers even though their 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are the same. 
Stage 1: geographical distribution to province j: 
 
Stage 2: distribution to municipalities: 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 × 𝑈𝐵𝑁𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 × 𝑈𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 × 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 
Provincial 
Municipality 
District Municipalities: 
   0.85 × [Urban Pop + 2 × Rural Pop] 
   + 0.10 × [managerial performance] 
   + 0.05 × [size in km2] 
 
20% 80% 
Stage 3: adjustments to ensure a minimum transfer of 8 (monthly) UITs to each municipality 
Source: Based on SD 156-2004 and SD 060-2010. 
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The absolute size of the revenues that municipalities receive from extractive industries 
and the equalization transfer program is significantly greater than at the regional level. The total 
amount of revenues received from extractive industries by municipalities during 2008 was 5,145 
million nuevos soles, more than three times the revenues regional governments received from the 
same source (1,669 millions nuevos soles). Similarly, the transfers allocated by the municipal 
equalization transfer program, the FONCOMUN, reached 3,257 million nuevos soles during the 
same year, an amount almost five times larger than the funds distributed by the FONCOR at the 
regional level. Moreover, together these two revenue sources represented 63.7 percent of total 
municipal government expenditures, compared to only 18.8 percent of total regional 
expenditures. 
Accordingly, we can expect the distortions imposed by the canon and other revenues 
from extractive industries to be larger at the local level. By the same token, the equalizing power 
of the FONCOMUN also can become a more critical policy issue at the local level. Tables 9 and 
10 present basic statistics describing the cross-section variability of these revenue sources across 
provincial and district municipalities, respectively. Both the coefficient of variation and the range 
of transfer amounts over the average show that in 2004 the variability of the revenues from 
extractive industries was already much larger than the variability of FONCOMUN transfers. 
Note also the remarkable explosion in revenues from extractive industries and their variability in 
2008. By comparison, transfers from the FONCOMUN appear to be less variable. From Table 9, 
we can see that the maximum per capita transfers received by a province in 2008 from extractive 
industries (Lucumba) was 25 times greater than the maximum per capita transfers from the 
FONCOMUN (the province of Lamud). This ratio reaches a value of 17 when comparing 
maximum transfers to districts, with Ilabaya receiving the greatest amount from extractive 
industries and San Jose de Ushua receiving the greatest amount from FONCOMUN.  
As we reviewed for FONCOR above, in the case of regional governments the equalizing 
power of the FONCOMUN for provinces and municipalities is compromised by several factors. 
First, the canon and other revenues from extractive industries are comparable to, or larger in 
magnitude than, those from the FONCOMUN. Second, FONCOMUN allocation criteria do not 
consider relative fiscal capacity, while the allocation of the canon does not consider expenditure 
needs. Note that the correlation coefficient between the two revenue sources in 2008 is zero or 
very close to zero for provinces and districts, which implies that the allocation of  the canon and 
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other revenues from extractive industries are in practice independent from the expenditure needs 
at the provincial level (as approximated by the FONCOMUN). 
 
Table 9. Variability of Provincial Revenues from Extractive Industries and FONCOMUN, 
2004 and 2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 
 2004 2008 
 Extractive industries FONCOMUN 
Extractive 
industries FONCOMUN 
     
Minimum 0.0 22.7 0.0 44.7 
Maximum 1,265.6 1,037.5 24,072.6 954.7 
     (province) (Purús ) (Iñapari) (Lucumba) (Lamud) 
     
simple average 51.3 161.3 397.6 260.1 
weighted average 8.3 25.7 44.5 46.6 
standard deviation 128.0 116.3 1,762.2 152.9 
coefficient of variation (*) 15.3 4.5 39.6 3.3 
(max - min)/average 151.6 39.5 541.5 19.5 
     
Correlation (extractive 
inds and FONCOMUN): 
0.12 0.00 
     
(*) The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MEF data. 
 
Besides the transfers from extractive industries and the FONCOMUN, there are several 
transfers from the central government to municipalities, which in 2008 represented 11 percent of 
current municipal revenues (see Table 5). The most important of these transfers is the Glass of 
Milk (Vaso de Leche) program, which stands for around 3 percent of current municipal revenues. 
This program targets to poor households with high nutritional needs, particularly pregnant or 
breastfeeding women, newborns and the elderly. Glass of Milk is a classic example of a 
conditional transfer program aimed to reach national objectives and administered entirely by the 
local governments. According to Stifel and Alderman (2003), the program has been successful in 
targeting poor households and fulfilling their nutrition needs. 
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Table 10. Variability of District Revenues from Extractive Industries and FONCOMUN, 
2004 and 2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 
 2004 2008 
 Extractive industries FONCOMUN 
Extractive 
industries FONCOMUN 
     
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 
Maximum 2,383.6 1,662.6 29,003.5 1,691.9 
     (district) (Lobitos) (Curibaya) (Ilabaya) 
(San Jose de 
Ushua) 
     
simple average 57.3 165.0 423.2 198.2 
weighted average 17.4 37.3 134.1 66.4 
standard deviation 129.1 167.0 1,257.0 154.5 
coefficient of variation (*) 7.4 4.5 9.4 2.3 
(max - min)/average 137.0 44.5 216.2 25.4 
     
Correlation (extractive 
inds and FONCOMUN): 
0.09 0.02 
     
(*) The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MEF data. 
 
 
Other transfers of less importance include local governments’ share of customs duties 
collected by SUNAT, and certain transfer programs designed to support capital expenditures. 
Local governments’ share of customs duties, which represented 1.3 percent of current municipal 
revenues in 2008, are justified as a means to finance local development initiatives and are 
distributed among jurisdictions with customs offices according to population and land area. On 
the other hand, capital transfers represent around 2 percent of current municipal revenues and 
include programs for the promotion of public investment, for social infrastructure and for 
construction of roads and streets.  
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5. Correcting Fiscal Incentives through the Computation of Fiscal 
Capacity  
Under an optimal assignment of revenue sources, all government units should face the same 
marginal costs of public funds (Dahlby and Wilson, 1994). Correcting the marginal costs faced 
by sub-national governments is one of the most important roles of intergovernmental 
equalization transfers. Actually, if the objective of equalization transfers is restated as the 
equalization of marginal costs of providing a standard bundle of public services, then a transfer 
program designed to equalize fiscal disparities becomes a powerful tool to simultaneously reach 
the objectives of efficiency and equity in a decentralized system of government (Martínez-
Vázquez and Sepulveda, 2011).  
As we have seen, there are currently two equalization transfer programs in place in Peru; 
FONCOR at the regional level and FONCOMUN at the local level. Their equalizing effect, 
however, is significantly limited by the presence of other transfers in the form of the canon and 
other revenues from extractive industries. For these reasons it is quite likely that the 
intergovernmental system is facing high efficiency and equity costs. The distortionary effects of 
the canon and other revenues from extractive industries have been widely recognized as a 
problem that needs to be addressed in the future reforms in Peru. For example, a recent document 
by USAID/Peru (Pro-Descentralización, 2010b) examines the opinion of relevant players in the 
decentralization process in order to identify the 16 most important priorities for future reform, 
and among them we can find issues involving inequalities caused by the current system of 
intergovernmental transfers.28
The ideal way to solve the problems created by the canon and other revenues from 
extractive industries would be to change the distribution criteria and, specifically, to eliminate 
the derivation principle from the revenue sharing scheme. However, it appears that it will not be 
politically feasible any time soon to make major reforms to the distribution criteria of revenues 
from extractive industries, as the current system has created a strong sense of entitlement in 
which the winners are not willing to give up their benefits. In this context, one possible strategy 
to address the problems of equity and efficiency from the canon is to attempt to neutralize its 
effects by incorporating measures of fiscal capacity that account for all revenue sources (other 
  
                                                          
28 Also mentioned is the need for reconsidering the assignment of expenditure responsibilities. However, the survey 
does not provide specific proposals to improve the current system. 
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than equalization transfers) into the formulas used in the equalization transfer programs 
(FONCOMUN and FONCOR). At the very least, this type of reform would allow the system to 
start reducing the exiting inequities and distortions before direct reforms to the laws on the 
canon, sobrecanon and royalties can actually be implemented.  
In this section we present several alternative methodologies for measuring fiscal capacity, 
and we illustrate their use by estimating the fiscal capacity of local governments in Peru. The 
approaches are assessed in terms of their possible accuracy and the feasibility of their prompt 
implementation.  
 
5.1   The Estimation of Own Revenue Potential and Fiscal Capacity 
 
Revenue potential or fiscal capacity can roughly be defined as the amount of revenues that a 
government would be able to raise under standard conditions of tax administration capacity and 
fiscal effort. The key aspect of this definition is the consideration of equal conditions in terms of 
administrative capacity and effort. By establishing common standards for all governments, we 
can conceptually distinguish what we might call a “fair” estimation of the amount of revenues 
they can potentially collect, from the amount of revenues they actually collect in practice. Many 
sub-national governments, especially in developing countries like Peru, commonly lack the 
technology, the technical ability or simply the financial recourses to administer and enforce the 
payment of taxes or the fees and charges from public services, and it would not be reasonable to 
expect that they would collect as much tax from their bases as others would. In contrast, other 
jurisdictions with the ability to collect abundant resources might voluntarily choose not to do so; 
in this case it would not be desirable to assume that they need financial or technical assistance.  
To better understand the relationship between actual (or observed) revenues and potential 
revenues, let us use this definition: 
Actual Revenues = (Revenue Potential + Administration Adjusts.) × Fiscal Effort Adjusts.      (1) 
 
where administration and fiscal effort adjustments are applicable to any source of own revenues 
in which sub-national governments have discretion over the amount of collections either because 
they can change policy parameters (for example, tax rates) or tax administration (for example, 
enforcement effort).  
The measure of revenue potential—and more precisely the measure of own revenue 
potential—becomes operational when used in the distribution formula of an equalization transfer 
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program. An equalization transfer program can be targeted to the reduction of horizontal 
disparities in expenditure needs and/or horizontal disparities in fiscal capacity. The international 
experience is rather mixed, but whenever expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are expected to 
be unevenly distributed across sub-national governments it is advisable to address both sources 
of imbalances. In such a case, the distribution of equalization transfers can be based on the 
measure of fiscal disparity, simply defined as: 
 
Fiscal Disparity = Expenditure Needs – Fiscal Capacity (2) 
 
Sub-national governments with positive fiscal disparity require additional funds to cover their 
expenditure needs, but sub-national governments with negative fiscal disparity do not require 
additional funds, at least according to the standards with respect to which expenditures needs and 
fiscal capacity have been defined.29
 
 In order to obtain the required estimation of fiscal capacity 
we need to focus exclusively on the revenue potential of those sources for which the sub-national 
government can exert some degree of discretion either by policy or administration choices. All 
other sources of revenues can be considered exogenous, with potential revenues being equal to 
actual revenues. The measure of fiscal capacity therefore could be written as: 
Fiscal Capacity = Own Revenue Potential + Transfers Received other than Equalization     (3) 
 
In this way the fiscal capacity measure summarizes all sources of funds, discretional and 
exogenous, that a sub-national government can use in order to cover its expenditure needs. Note 
that if equalization transfers are distributed according to equations (2) and (3), then, other things 
equal, sub-national governments receiving more revenues from extractive industries would 
receive fewer equalization transfers.30 Therefore, by incorporating the measure of fiscal capacity 
in the distribution formula of an equalization transfer program, we can at least partially 
counterbalance the effects of the canon and other revenues from extractive industries.31
                                                          
29 Boex and Martínez-Vázquez (2007) provide a review of international practices in the choice of equalization 
criteria, as well as detailed explanations of alternative methodologies for estimating expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity.  
 
30 In many countries sub-national governments have quite limited tax autonomy, and the bulk of their revenues is 
derived from sharing in national taxes or other forms of transfers. This is especially true for regional governments in 
Peru, but it is also a common phenomenon in most less developed and transitional countries around the world. In 
some of these cases fiscal capacity can be safely measured by the actual or forecast level of shared revenues and 
transfers. 
31 This principle holds even if part of the revenues from extractive industries is correctly justified as compensation 
for environmental costs. In that case greater environmental costs can easily be incorporated into the estimations of 
the expenditure needs of jurisdictions where resource extraction takes place. See Gómez, Martínez-Vázquez and 
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There are several possible methodologies that can be used to estimate sub-national fiscal 
capacity. In the following discussion we will implement three of them, which we have selected 
because of their applicability to the current conditions of data availability in Peru. In what 
follows we discuss the three methodologies; they are presented in order from the simplest and 
least data-intensive to the most complex and demanding in terms of information. 
 
Methodology 1: Multi-year lagged averages of relative own revenue collections per capita 
This methodology has minimum data requirements because it is based only on historical data 
about own revenue collections. The disadvantage of using historical data is that it can plausibly 
create perverse incentives by inducing sub-national authorities to collect fewer taxes in order to 
receive more (costless) transfers in the future. This methodology, as developed in Martínez-
Vázquez and Zekate (2002), has been designed to minimize those incentives given that historical 
data need to be used.  
 The first step consists of computing the ratio of actual own revenues per capita of each 
jurisdiction to average own revenues per capita for all jurisdictions of the same level during a 
certain year. The next step consists of computing this measure of relative per capita collections 
for several (maybe three or five) past years and obtaining their average. The final step is to 
multiply the ratio of average per capita collections to the national average by the aggregate per 
capita revenue forecast for the entire group of sub-national governments to yield the estimated 
tax collection potential per inhabitant for each sub-national unit.  
Although the approach may be effective in reducing perverse incentives to sub-national 
fiscal behavior associated with the use of historical data, the results still need to be interpreted 
with caution as the approach does not identify or correct for differences across governments in 
administrative capacity or fiscal effort. Relative per capita collections might well be perpetuating 
severe horizontal disparities that cannot be corrected through this methodology. For this reason 
estimations of fiscal capacity based on multi-year averages of relative revenue collections are 
advisable only when there are no additional quality data available to improve these estimates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Sepúlveda (2009a, 2009b) for more extensive discussions about the design and implementation of equalization 
transfer programs and applications for Peru. 
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Methodology 2: Basic proxies for the ability to pay and collect taxes 
A different approach to the estimation of potential own revenues consists of using variables that 
could credibly serve as indirect measures of sub-national tax bases. The obvious advantages of 
this approach are that no perverse incentives are provided to sub-national authorities32
 
 and that 
measures are not subject to errors related to the perpetuation of historical disparities in sub-
national revenue potential. It is difficult, however, to find a variable that accurately describes the 
ability of governments to collect taxes. Common examples of these variables are personal 
income and gross domestic product inside the jurisdiction, but accurate measures of these 
variables are rarely available in developing countries. Even if they do exist, they would not 
necessarily provide an accurate portrayal of the absolute or relative size of sub-national tax 
bases.  
Methodology 3: Regression-based representative revenue system 
The representative revenue system was first developed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1986), and its objective is to estimate the amount of revenues a 
government would collect from the available tax bases if it exerts an average level of fiscal 
effort. This methodology requires data on (or estimates of) sub-national tax bases, and it usually 
interprets average fiscal effort as the average level of effective tax rates applied across the 
national territory. 
Absent any estimates of the tax bases faced by sub-national governments in Peru, here we 
develop a simple variation of this methodology that uses regressions similar to the ones 
presented in the previous section. These regressions, presented in columns (1) and (5) of Table 
A2 (Appendix 1), include the same factors we have used to explain sub-national revenue 
performance, excluding intergovernmental transfers. The predicted value obtained with these 
regressions can be interpreted as potential revenue collections because they are obtained by 
considering the variables used to estimate the size of the tax base and other factors representing 
administrative capacity. 
 
                                                          
32 As long as the proxies used cannot be modified by sub-national governments.  
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5.2  An Application to Municipal Governments in Peru 
 
The three methodologies for estimating revenue potential are applied separately to provincial and 
district governments. Since provincial governments have additional expenditure responsibilities 
and revenue assignments, they can be expected to face different fiscal conditions. Similarly, we 
distinguish in the estimation between tax revenue collections and other own revenue sources like 
fees and user charges, because collections of these two sources of revenue are not necessarily 
determined by the same factors.  
A few clarifications about the implementation of the methodologies are in order. All 
methodologies have been carried out as if the last available data were from 2008, and actual 
figures of revenue collections of 2009 have been assumed to correspond to (accurate) aggregate 
revenue forecasts.  
The first methodology, based on multi-year averages of relative own revenue collections 
per capita, uses data from three-year periods corresponding to 2006-2008. The second 
methodology, based on basic proxies for the ability to pay and collect taxes, uses estimates of the 
gross domestic product GDP for all Peruvian districts, which have been developed by Llempén, 
Morón and Seminario (2010).  
The third methodology, based on the representative revenue system, leads in some cases 
to negative values for potential revenue collections.33
To provide a general idea of the results obtained under the three methodologies we map 
the results in Figure 1. The methodologies are represented in order from left to right, and greater 
estimates of per capita fiscal disparity are represented by darker colors. As we can expect, the 
first methodology provides estimates that seem to closely match actual revenue collections, but 
this is not surprising given the use of historical data to arrive at those estimates. While some 
differences in results may be expected when using different methodologies, we can identify some 
common patterns. For instance, districts in the provinces of Lima and Callao appear as having 
 This is not a plausible result, and it is the 
consequence of the poor explanatory power of our regression, which in turn is explained by 
omitted variable bias. There are important determinants of revenue collection, such as 
administrative capacity, institutional development and taxpayers’ compliance behavior, among 
others, that we could not control for because there are no available measures for them in Peru.  
                                                          
33 The estimations of potential revenue collections are based on the results of the regression analysis presented in 
Section 3. The coefficients used are those corresponding to GDP per capita, poverty, percentages of population by 
age groups, area, percentage of agricultural workers and dummies for regions and years. 
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relatively high own revenue potential. The region of Tacna (in the south) also displays high 
revenue potential, perhaps reflecting spillover effects generated by trade with neighboring 
countries.  
 
Figure 1. Tax Capacity at the Local Level 
methodology 1 methodology 2 methodology 3 
     
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes: Darker areas represent municipalities with higher tax capacity. The first graph shows the results from the 
average lagged revenues approach. The second graph shows the results from using a proxy (GDP) approach. 
The third graph shows the results from the regression-based representative revenue system approach.  
 
Among the three methodologies, we argue that the regression-based representative 
revenue system is the ideal option, because it permits estimating own revenue potential while 
properly controlling for other factors that explain the difference between potential and actual 
revenues. It is not applicable to municipal governments in Peru in the short run, however, 
because important variables that need to be considered are not yet available. In order to 
implement this methodology it would be desirable first to develop good measures of 
administrative and technical capacity, institutional development, and other variables that might 
be helpful in explaining actual revenue collections, like corruption among government officials, 
tax morale and community demand for local public services. Such variables are difficult to 
develop, particularly at the local level, but reasonably good proxies might be found.  
  Lima 
  Callao 
  Tacna 
  Lima 
  Callao 
  Tacna 
  Lima 
  Callao 
  Tacna 
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While the regression-based representative revenue system estimates are being improved, 
less desirable but currently feasible methodologies might be implemented. The results from the 
first and second methodologies are also presented here as examples of possible alternatives. 
Tables 11 and 12 present basic statistics on the distribution of actual and potential revenues as 
well as revenues from FONCOMUN for the provincial level and district level, respectively. The 
distribution and variability of the three series of revenue potential estimates, and of course 
especially for the first methodology, are similar to those of actual revenues. Especially relevant is 
the fact that the application of all three methodologies for the group of districts, either based 
directly on actual revenues or on a different variable like the GDP, are uncorrelated with the 
FONCOMUN. This suggests that the FONCOMUN is not currently compensating those districts 
with lower fiscal capacity. 
 
Table 11. Basic Statistics for Actual and Potential Own Revenues Per Capita of Provinces 
(in nuevos soles) 
 
 
Actual own 
revenues 
method 
1 
method 
2 
method 
3 
FONCOMUN 
      
Minimum 4.1 4.0 32.3 0.0 46.9 
Maximum 2,503.6 2,557.9 1,202.6 996.7 1,067.0 
Average 107.0 110.3 190.6 119.9 288.7 
Standard deviation 218.9 217.3 142.5 122.1 174.5 
Coefficient of variation 2.0 2.0 0.7 1.0 0.6 
(max - min)/average 23.4 23.2 6.1 8.3 3.5 
      
Correlation with actual own 
revenues 1.00 0.99 0.26 0.68 0.03 
Correlation with 
FONCOMUN 0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.22 1.00 
      
 Sources: MEF and authors’ estimations.      
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The FONCOMUN performs better among provinces in terms of the equalization of fiscal 
conditions. Its correlation with methodologies 2 and 3 is -0.19 and -0.22, respectively, which 
suggests that the criteria for distributing the equalization fund across provinces (unmet basic 
needs) might be capturing certain aspects of relative fiscal capacity. 
 
Table 12.  Basic Statistics for Actual and Potential Own Revenues Per Capita of Districts 
(in nuevos soles) 
 
 
Actual own 
revenues 
method 
1 
method 
2 
method 
3 
FONCOMU
N 
      
Minimum 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 7.7 
Maximum 2,857.0 3,454.8 4,013.3 607.9 1,861.1 
Average 53.9 60.8 75.2 44.5 219.4 
Standard deviation 176.5 199.5 172.9 63.7 177.3 
Coefficient of variation 3.3 3.3 2.3 1.4 0.8 
(max - min)/average 53.0 56.8 53.3 13.7 8.4 
      
Correlation with actual own 
revenues 1.00 0.97 0.25 0.50 -0.02 
Correlation with 
FONCOMUN -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 1.00 
      
Sources: MEF and authors’ estimations.      
 
5.3 Fiscal Effort: Actual versus Potential Revenues in Peruvian Municipalities 
 
While we acknowledge that limited data availability does not allow for the perfect estimation of 
fiscal capacity with the regression-based representative revenue system, we argue that this is 
conceptually the most appropriate methodology, and that future work could be devoted to 
developing the variables required for this methodology to perform correctly. Here we use the 
own revenue potential estimations obtained under this methodology to perform a preliminary 
analysis of fiscal effort among local governments in Peru.     
Following equation (1) we can define relative fiscal effort as the ratio of actual own 
revenues over own revenue potential (adjusted by administrative capacity).34
                                                          
34 Dividing the two sides of equation 1 by Revenue Potential + Administration Adjustments (due to differences in 
administrative capacity) we obtain: 
 For a measure of 
Actual Revenues = Fiscal Effort Potential Revenues + Administration Adjustments 
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fiscal effort greater (lower) than one, the government would be exerting relatively more (less) 
fiscal effort than the average level of effort. Again, due to data limitations it is not possible to 
obtain unbiased estimations of fiscal effort. Therefore our results should be interpreted with 
caution and considered only as preliminary illustrations of local fiscal effort estimates for 
Peruvian municipalities.35
In Figure 2 we show the relation between potential and actual tax and other own (non-
tax) revenues for provincial and district governments in Peru. Actual revenues are measured in 
the vertical axis and potential revenues in the horizontal axis, thus those municipalities lying 
above (below) the 45 degree line have collections greater (lower) than their potential. 
  
The four graphs suggest that Peruvian municipalities exert very different levels of fiscal 
effort, and there seems to be no clear pattern among municipalities of the same type or 
collections from similar sources. The differences in the distances with respect to the origin 
inform about the disparities in actual tax collections and/or revenue potential, and the high 
concentration of municipalities close to the origin, as is the case with provincial taxes and both 
revenue sources at the district level, suggests that many municipalities actually collect few taxes 
because their revenue potential is also very poor.  
On the other hand, the distances from the 45 degree line could plausibly be explained by 
the limited explanatory power of our estimates. For instance, there are significant differences 
between the actual and potential revenues in some areas around Metropolitan Lima and business 
districts like Arequipa. Municipalities with high tax bases due to their economic activity (i.e., 
Lima, Miraflores, San Isidro, San Juan de Lurigancho, Callao, etc) appear as collecting much 
more own tax revenue than their potential, while municipalities with smaller tax bases (i.e., 
Rimac, Villa Maria del Triunfo, Comas, etc.) collect far less than what their estimated tax 
revenue potential. The rural areas show similar results but with smaller differences between 
actual and potential revenue. In general, similar patterns are also observed for non-tax revenue 
collections.36
 
   
                                                          
35 The omitted bias problem might be especially relevant in Peru, where administration capacity is irregularly 
distributed among governments of the same level. 
36 We also carried out a regression analysis in order to find the determinants of fiscal effort among Peruvian 
municipalities, but the analysis showed no significant results. We interpret that this outcome might be caused by the 
aforementioned data limitations and possible biases in our revenue potential estimates. 
44 
 
Figure 2. Provincial and District Distributions of Fiscal Effort 
 
 
 
 Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
6. Exploring Alternative Sources for Regional Revenue Autonomy 
One of the most relevant problems with the current assignment of revenue sources to sub-
national governments in Peru is the absence of revenue autonomy at the regional level. In fact, as 
we have seen, regional governments have not been assigned their own tax instruments. Thus, one 
important issue that needs to be addressed is what tax sources can be assigned to the intermediate 
level of government in the Peru context. The issue is explored in this section. 
In general, the assignment of tax instruments to the intermediate levels of government 
faces several difficulties. While economies of scale in tax administration and possible 
coordination problems usually make it advisable to keep the administration of many productive 
tax revenue sources at the central level, the gains from revenue decentralization are often greater 
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at the local level, where proximity to taxpayers facilitates fulfillment of the benefit principle in 
taxation. The greater proximity of local governments in some cases could also help to reduce 
costs of administration, enforcement and compliance and help increase accountability.37
Difficulties in finding own tax revenue sources for intermediate level governments, 
however, do not reduce the importance of own revenues for promoting fiscal autonomy and 
accountability for regional governments. A common approach to fostering fiscal autonomy at the 
intermediate levels of government is to allow the cohabitation of tax bases with the central 
government, as in the cases of piggyback personal income taxes, and cohabitation in some cases 
with local tax bases, as in the case of the property tax. Other times, some exclusive basis may be 
found, such as assignment of a payroll tax at the regional level.
 
38
An even more common practice is defining revenue-sharing schemes on a derivation 
basis, as a fixed proportion of central government tax collections from one or several tax 
instruments in the jurisdiction.
  
39
One limitation is that “fixed” revenue-sharing schemes do not allow regional authorities 
to alter the amount of revenues received. As a consequence, they have no fiscal autonomy on the 
margin and are not perceived by taxpayers as responsible for marginal changes in the budget, 
which in practice may reduce their accountability and constituents’ incentives to participate in 
regional decisions. A good solution is to allow for “flexible” revenue sharing schemes by in fact 
converting the revenue sharing into a piggyback tax, where tax rates can be altered within a 
range by the regional authorities. Piggyback schemes have been effective in a number of 
developed and developing countries: Nordic European countries, the United States, Spain, Japan, 
and several Eastern European countries.
 These schemes may allow regional governments to enjoy 
productive and buoyant revenue sources without assuming the administrative and political costs 
of collecting taxes. For these reasons revenue sharing schemes are understandably a very 
attractive revenue source for those authorities in the benefited areas, but they also have important 
limitations.  
40
                                                          
37 For a review of tax administration issues at the sub-national level see Martínez-Vázquez and Timofeev (2010). 
 
38 But even here the tax base is in cohabitation with social security taxes.  
39 Another approach, fairly common in Latin American countries, is to define the revenue-sharing scheme as a fixed 
proportion of central government tax collections, and then to distribute the available funds among regional 
governments in accordance with certain equalizing criteria. In many case, this arrangement is in reality a funding 
mechanism for an equalization transfer fund or some other form of transfer, an aspect of the system of sub-national 
finances that is not discussed further in this paper. 
40 For further discussion see Bird, Ebel and Wallich (1995), Rao (2007) and Martínez-Vázquez (2008). 
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Another limitation of revenue-sharing schemes on a derivation basis is that they normally 
create additional horizontal inequalities due to the uneven distribution of tax bases across the 
national territory. However, this is a problem fully shared with options creating revenue 
autonomy. For this reason the implementation of new revenue autonomy or revenue-sharing 
schemes on a derivation basis needs to be accompanied by additional funds to the equalization 
transfer program in place or, if possible, improvements in its equalizing power via a change in 
the distribution formula. Below we explore in greater depth several potential alternatives for 
improving regional tax autonomy and accountability.  
 
6.1   Options for Cohabitation with Central Government Tax Bases  
 
In the first place, we must make it clear that some important central government tax bases might 
not be very suitable for introducing piggyback or even revenue-sharing schemes on a derivation 
basis with regional governments. This is the case, for example, of the corporate income tax 
(CIT), customs taxes, or even the VAT and most excises. But before we explore what some of 
the options may be, it is important to review the geographical distribution of central tax 
collections. 
SUNAT is responsible for administering and collecting the largest and most buoyant 
taxes in Peru. Table 13 shows the main central government tax collections by region in 2008. 
Domestic taxes represent 71 percent of total tax collections, and more than 84 percent of these 
taxes are collected in Metropolitan Lima. There are few regions contributing with more than 1 
percent of domestic tax collections. Besides Callao, which provides around 5 percent of domestic 
taxes, only Piura contributes more than 2 percent, while Cusco and La Libertad each provide 1.4 
percent. A similar pattern is observed in each of the two main aggregates of domestic taxes, the 
income tax and the taxes on production and consumption.  
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Table 13. SUNAT’s Tax Revenue Collections by Region (2008) 
(in thousands of nuevos soles and as percent of total) 
 
 
Income taxes 
Taxes on 
production and 
consumption 
Domestic taxes 
Taxes on 
international trade 
(*) 
  %  %  %  % 
         
Amazonas 10,747 0.0 1,107 0.0 14,915 0.0 0 0.0 
Ancash 135,131 0.6 76,933 0.4 237,986 0.5 209,507 1.2 
Apurimac 9,044 0.0 5,233 0.0 17,916 0.0 0 0.0 
Arequipa 40,856 0.2 28,200 0.2 76,012 0.2 21,473 0.1 
Ayacucho 1,363 0.0 839 0.0 2,555 0.0 0 0.0 
Cajamarca 67,702 0.3 51,997 0.3 135,317 0.3 0 0.0 
Callao 944,449 4.2 1,344,756 7.4 2,471,194 5.5 15,795,190 86.8 
Cusco 467,352 2.1 113,837 0.6 618,551 1.4 371 0.0 
Huancavelica 4,569 0.0 8,011 0.0 13,727 0.0 0 0.0 
Huanuco 22,043 0.1 4,857 0.0 31,766 0.1 0 0.0 
Ica 145,641 0.6 151,440 0.8 324,269 0.7 634,891 3.5 
Junín 142,436 0.6 80,505 0.4 263,554 0.6 0 0.0 
La Libertad 287,556 1.3 271,813 1.5 635,781 1.4 159,326 0.9 
Lambayeque 109,758 0.5 106,258 0.6 242,194 0.5 6,232 0.0 
Lima 54,436 0.2 69,945 0.4 146,368 0.3 0 0.0 
Loreto 120,266 0.5 37,618 0.2 180,944 0.4 109,267 0.6 
Madre De Dios 21,807 0.1 5,070 0.0 30,745 0.1 2,373 0.0 
Moquegua 22,109 0.1 20,805 0.1 47,717 0.1 174,782 1.0 
Pasco 18,463 0.1 16,182 0.1 37,984 0.1 0 0.0 
Piura 454,860 2.0 462,640 2.5 976,325 2.2 350,981 1.9 
Puno 43,413 0.2 30,615 0.2 87,292 0.2 102,637 0.6 
San Martin 48,114 0.2 23,652 0.1 81,793 0.2 567 0.0 
Tacna 62,828 0.3 45,386 0.2 122,804 0.3 559,902 3.1 
Tumbes 12,958 0.1 10,769 0.1 29,081 0.1 58,277 0.3 
Ucayali 59,786 0.3 134,627 0.7 208,121 0.5 1,037 0.0 
         
Total Regions 3,307,688 14.6 3,103,094 17.0 7,034,912 15.6 18,186,814 100.0 
         
Lima Metro. 19,400,081 85.4 15,131,327 83.0 38,048,935 84.4 0 0.0 
Total by source 22,707,770 100.0 18,234,421 100.0 45,083,847 100.0 18,186,814 100.0 
Share on total  35.9 28.8   71.3  28.7 
         
(*) Include import duties, VAT, excises and other less relevant taxes. 
Source: SUNAT. 
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The concentration of tax collections is explained by the location of large taxpayers and 
the level of economic activity. For instance, almost 90 percent of collections from the corporate 
income tax (which stands for 66 percent of income tax collections in 2008), comes from large 
taxpayers located in Lima. On the other hand, taxes on international trade are also very 
concentrated, but this time in Callao, given the location of the Customs Office, with 87 percent 
of tax collections, and in other regions with ports and customs like Ica and Tacna.41
The concentration of tax revenue collections in Metropolitan Lima and Callao suggest 
that the tax bases in the regions might not be able to provide significant resources through 
piggybacking on central taxes or even revenue-sharing schemes. In addition, some regions 
contribute small or even negligible amounts to tax collections, implying that there are notable 
differences in the size of tax bases across regions.   
  
The usefulness of regional tax bases for possible own revenue sources can better be 
assessed by considering the size of the budget under regional government control. In Table 14 
we present regional collections for the main central government taxes and, for comparative 
purposes, the main regional revenue sources as shares of regional expenditures. Transfers of 
ordinary resources are by far the main revenue source for regional governments, while revenues 
from extractive industries represent significant shares of expenditures only in certain regions; 
others regions seem to be partially compensated by the funds received from the FONCOR.  
Note that several regional governments receive more transfers in the form of ordinary 
resources than the total amount of domestic taxes the central government is able to collect in 
their region.42 In other words, several regions might not have the tax bases required to finance 
their actual spending levels (at the prevailing tax rates) and therefore would necessarily depend 
on net subsidies from the center in order to perform in accordance with the current spending 
standards.43
 
 Although of less interest to us, note that it seems that no central government revenue 
source could provide, through a derivation-based revenue sharing scheme, significant revenues 
to all regional governments. 
                                                          
41 The taxes on international trade consist of import duties (representing 10 percent of taxes on international trade 
during 2008), VAT (85 percent), excises (4 percent) and other minor taxes. 
42 The exceptions are Callao, Cusco, Ica, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Piura, Tacna, Ucayali, and Metropolitan Lima. 
43 It is worth noting that this is a situation also experienced in many other countries around the world, and explains 
the relevance, in Peru and many other countries, of intergovernmental equalization transfers.  
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Table 14. Regional and Central Government Revenues as Shares of Regional Expenditures, 
2008 (in percent) 
 
 
Regional revenues 
 
Central government tax collections 
 
FONCOR Extractive 
industries 
Ordinary 
resources 
(excluding 
FONCOR) 
Other 
regional 
revenues 
Domestic taxes Taxes on 
internation
al trade 
(*) 
On Income  
On prod. 
and cons. 
Total 
         
Amazonas 13.8 0.0 67.3 31.6 3.5 0.4 4.9 0.0 
Ancash 1.4 36.8 66.4 53.6 17.6 10.0 31.0 27.3 
Apurimac 15.2 1.6 77.0 11.2 2.5 1.5 5.0 0.0 
Arequipa 4.9 14.8 70.4 28.3 5.0 3.5 9.4 2.7 
Ayacucho 7.7 5.5 81.0 14.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Cajamarca 1.2 9.4 72.2 10.9 9.0 6.9 18.0 0.0 
Callao 0.3 0.3 49.2 42.7 234.6 334.1 614.0 3,924.3 
Cusco 1.1 28.2 58.8 12.2 54.0 13.1 71.4 0.0 
Huancavelica 14.1 8.5 70.0 10.5 1.2 2.1 3.5 0.0 
Huanuco 10.4 0.6 79.6 18.0 5.4 1.2 7.8 0.0 
Ica 2.6 0.9 84.8 8.4 34.5 35.8 76.7 150.2 
Junín 4.3 5.3 84.2 13.8 20.6 11.6 38.1 0.0 
La Libertad 5.1 8.2 73.0 18.4 33.0 31.2 72.9 18.3 
Lambayeque 4.8 0.0 84.4 30.4 21.1 20.4 46.6 1.2 
Lima 3.8 11.1 74.4 13.3 9.3 11.9 24.9 0.0 
Loreto 0.9 25.5 62.0 13.4 16.7 5.2 25.2 15.2 
Madre De Dios 10.0 0.1 76.0 35.6 17.2 4.0 24.2 1.9 
Moquegua 2.1 32.2 47.3 21.9 9.6 9.0 20.7 75.9 
Pasco 5.4 1.9 54.0 14.5 7.1 6.3 14.7 0.0 
Piura 5.2 12.7 72.0 24.9 58.4 59.4 125.3 45.0 
Puno 5.7 7.7 82.0 11.3 6.2 4.4 12.4 14.6 
San Martin 12.4 0.0 60.7 18.2 8.3 4.1 14.0 0.1 
Tacna 1.8 55.1 49.0 15.8 18.2 13.1 35.6 162.1 
Tumbes 5.1 14.1 79.0 9.9 6.4 5.3 14.3 28.6 
Ucayali 5.4 20.0 63.5 30.6 18.2 41.0 63.4 0.3 
         
Regional average 5.1 12.9 70.3 20.4 25.6 24.0 54.5 140.8 
         
Lima Metro. 2.0 0.6 3.7 123.9 2,677.4 2,088.3 5,251.1 0.0 
National average 4.9 12.2 66.7 25.9 166.5 133.7 330.5 133.3 
         
(*) Include import duties, VAT, excises and other less relevant taxes. 
Sources: SUNAT, DNCP, MEF. 
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The relatively small share of tax revenue collections over regional expenditures is to 
some extent the result of the high level of noncompliance observed in the most important tax 
instruments used by the central government. Tax evasion is an important source of tax collection 
erosion in countries with a low or medium level of development, where incentives to escape the 
burden of taxation are high and the enforcement mechanisms are weak. This is the case of Peru, 
where tax compliance seems to perform below international standards.44 In a recent study, Arias 
(2010) estimated the tax evasion rates of the most important groups of central government taxes 
for 2006. Tax evasion was estimated at 32.6 percent of potential personal income tax revenue 
collections and 51.3 percent of potential corporate income tax revenue collections. These 
estimates suggest that tax collections in Peru are far below their potential, and therefore that 
reforms in areas such as tax administration and tax collection might lead to significantly greater 
collections nationally and from each region. Unfortunately, however, there is no information 
about how tax evasion affects tax collections by region, and thus it is difficult to arrive at precise 
estimates of potential regional revenues for possible cohabitation of central and regional 
governments in the same tax bases. Besides the problem of tax compliance, another major factor 
in reducing revenue collections is the existence of several tax expenditure programs. These can 
be defined as spending programs implicitly implemented through the tax system. They consist of 
tax credits, deductions, exemptions and other preferential treatment arrangements that benefit 
certain groups of individuals or firms. Tax expenditures might be a simple, politically feasible 
and even efficient way to direct resources in the economy, but they could also introduce 
significant complexity into the system and might not be as easy to adjust and target as other 
transfer programs. SUNAT (2009) estimated the tax expenditures for the year 2010 at 2.13 
percent of GDP. Indirect taxes, mainly the VAT, are the main source of tax expenditures in Peru, 
representing 1.86 of GDP.45
                                                          
44 Tax evasion is also a pervasive problem in other Latin American countries. Alm and Martínez-Vázquez (2007) 
provide information about the size of the shadow economy in several countries and regions around the world. Given 
that the size of the shadow economy increases with tax evasion, this variable reports the magnitude of the problem 
of noncompliance in a country. The average size of the shadow economy reported for Latin America is 41 percent of 
Gross National Product (GNP), with the maximum value found in Bolivia (67 percent of GNP) and the minimum in 
Chile (20 percent of GNP). The size of the shadow economy in Peru is relatively large, representing 60 percent of 
GNP. 
 A great deal of the tax expenditures carried out through the VAT are 
related with exemptions for basic services in the agricultural and fishing sector; but in general 
45 The VAT (also known as the General Sales Tax) represent 73 percent of total tax expenditures estimated for 2010, 
while tariffs represent 9 percent and excise taxes 5 percent. 
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VAT tax expenditures seem to be driven by redistributive objectives. Indeed, more than 40 
percent of the benefits are directed to Amazonian regions, characterized by relatively small 
population but high poverty rates.46
Considering both the available estimates of tax evasion and estimates of tax expenditures, 
it seems reasonable to expect that revenue collections will increase with future improvements to 
the system. In this sense, it is important to consider that the potential gains in revenue autonomy 
associated with a reform providing regional governments with new revenue sources may likely 
increase if such an initiative is accompanied by nationwide reforms in the tax system aimed at 
improving compliance for the main tax instruments. 
 Direct taxes explain a much smaller, although still relevant, 
proportion of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures from the personal income tax are estimated at 
0.16 percent of GDP, and those from the corporate income tax at 0.12 percent of GDP. 
Table 15 presents the same regional and central government revenue sources in per capita 
terms. The data on per capita revenues can be used to compare the observed productivity of tax 
bases across regions, which are shown to be very uneven. In Ayacucho, for instance, the central 
government collects only 4 nuevos soles per inhabitant, and in six other regions (Amazonas, 
Apurimac, Arequipa, Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Huanuco) per capita revenues do not exceed 100 
nuevos soles. In contrast, Callao, Ica, Moquegua, Tacna and Metrpolitan Lima contribute 
revenues far above 1,000 nuevos soles per capita.  
The correlation between regional revenues per capita, particularly from the FONCOR, 
and per capita collections by the central government shows how alternative autonomous revenue 
sources or even revenue-sharing schemes might intensify or counterbalance existing regional 
inequalities. Given that the distribution of the FONCOR is implicitly based on estimates of fiscal 
disparities, then other revenue sources displaying a positive (negative) correlation with the 
FONCOR may be said to have a positive (negative) equalizing potential effect at the regional 
level. The only revenue sources displaying a positive correlation with the FONCOR are the 
historically based and gap-filling transfers known as “ordinary resources” and other regional 
revenues, from which we may conclude that the central government is, at least to some extent, 
implementing (if not explicitly considering) equalization criteria while financing regional 
expenditures through these two sources. Note, as also discussed above, that the revenues from 
extractive industries seem to have the effect of aggravating existing fiscal disparities.  
                                                          
46 The Amazonia regions are Loreto, Amazonas, Cajamarca, Madre de Dios, San Martin and Ucayali. 
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Table 15. Regional Revenues and SUNAT’s Tax Revenue Collections per Capita by Region, 
2008 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 
 Regional revenues  Central government’s tax collections 
 
FONCOR Extractive 
industries 
Ordinary 
resources 
(excluding 
FONCOR) 
Other 
regional 
revenues 
Domestic taxes Taxes on inter-
national 
trade 
(*) 
On Income  On prod. and cons. Total 
         
Amazonas 112 0 549 257 29 3 40 0 
Ancash 10 266 479 386 127 72 224 197 
Apurimac 135 15 685 99 22 13 44 0 
Arequipa 34 104 494 199 35 24 66 19 
Ayacucho 61 44 643 111 2 1 4 0 
Cajamarca 6 51 391 59 49 37 98 0 
Callao 1 1 226 196 1,077 1,534 2,818 18,013 
Cusco 8 209 435 90 399 97 528 0 
Huancavelica 120 73 598 89 10 18 30 0 
Huanuco 56 3 427 96 29 6 42 0 
Ica 15 6 503 50 205 213 455 892 
Junín 24 30 473 78 116 65 214 0 
La Libertad 27 44 393 99 178 168 393 99 
Lambayeque 22 0 394 142 99 95 218 6 
Lima 26 77 520 93 65 83 174 0 
Loreto 7 206 499 108 135 42 203 123 
Madre De Dios 116 1 880 412 199 46 281 22 
Moquegua 30 460 674 312 137 129 295 1,082 
Pasco 50 18 498 134 66 58 135 0 
Piura 24 59 335 116 271 276 582 209 
Puno 32 43 455 63 34 24 69 81 
San Martin 99 0 485 145 66 32 112 1 
Tacna 22 659 586 189 218 157 425 1,939 
Tumbes 52 144 805 101 65 54 145 291 
Ucayali 41 152 482 232 138 312 482 2 
         
Total Regions 33 84 458 133 167 157 355 918 
         
Lima Metro. 2 1 4 118 2,551 1,989 5,003 0 
National average 25 61 332 129 828 665 1,644 663 
Correlation coefficients (exclude Lima Metro.) 
FONCOR 1.00 -0.31 0.59 0.17 -0.39 -0.33 -0.36 -0.26 
Extractive industries  1.00 0.20 0.31 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 
Ordinary resources (excluding FONCOR) 1.00 0.34 -0.45 -0.48 -0.47 -0.40 
Other regional 
revenues    1.00 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.11 
         
(*) Include import duties, VAT, excises and other less relevant taxes. 
Sources: SUNAT, DNCP, MEF. 
 
The territorial analysis of central government tax collections leads to two somewhat 
discouraging conclusions about the revenue potential of piggyback taxes or even possible 
revenue sharing schemes. First, new regional taxes cohabitating central tax bases would be able 
to provide significant funds to only a few regional governments. Second, such a policy move 
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would introduce additional fiscal disparities. The latter problem can be handled by additional 
strengthening of the regional equalization scheme, the FONCOR, incorporating additional funds 
currently transferred to regional governments through other programs (e.g., ordinary resources). 
But ultimately, what needs to be weighted is the gain from greater fiscal autonomy and 
accountability for regional governments, even if little revenue can be raised in many regions.  
Several tax instruments offer the possibility of being assigned to the regional 
governments, and choosing the most appropriate way to do so requires weighing several 
advantages and disadvantages.47
The Single Revised Text of the Income Tax Law (approved by Supreme Decree No. 179 
of 2004) establishes five categories of taxable income. Besides the corporate income tax, which 
corresponds to the third category, the law defines four categories of taxable income for 
individuals. The first and second categories encompass capital income in the form of rents from 
property leases and returns on financial investments, respectively. It could be argued that these 
types of personal income are not necessarily generated in the region where a taxpayer lives, and 
thus they would not adequately fulfill the benefit principle. Alternatively, however, horizontal 
and vertical equity considerations may call for the use of capital income taxes, as they allow 
distributing tax burdens progressively across income levels. Therefore, capital income may or 
may not be included in the tax base of the regional personal income tax. A clearer case can be 
made for the inclusion of professional income and the tax on wages, which correspond to the 
fourth and fifth categories, respectively of the Income Tax Law. These taxes simultaneously 
satisfy the benefit principle and equity considerations, and at the same time they increase the 
accountability of regional authorities. Unfortunately, it is also very likely that a more intense use 
 The most effective alternative for increasing revenue autonomy 
and accountability at the regional level is to provide regional governments a piggyback personal 
income tax with discretion to set a flat rate within certain ranges. This would be a residence-
based tax, since taxpayers usually benefit most from public services in the region where they 
live. In that sense, this piggyback personal income tax can be expected to roughly satisfy the 
benefit principle of taxation. The additional advantage is that this is one of the most visible taxes, 
even when collected via withholding, and therefore taxpayers are more likely to notice any tax 
rate increase by the regional government and increase the accountability of government 
authorities. 
                                                          
47 See, for example, Ter-Minassian (1997), McLure (1998), Bird (2000) and Martinez- Vazquez (2008). 
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of these taxes might exacerbate the problem of labor informality already encountered in Peru; 
therefore their use at the regional level should also be accompanied by measures that incentivize 
tax compliance and reduce the push toward informality. 
An additional question that needs to be considered is the regional scope of the piggyback 
personal income tax. Given the particular characteristics of the Constitutional Province of Callao 
and Metropolitan Lima, it is possible to make a case for treating them separately. These two 
jurisdictions do not lack own revenue collections at present, and providing them with the 
regional personal income tax would exacerbate existing fiscal disparities to a degree that a 
reformed FONCOR may not be able to address. On the other hand, discriminating against 
regions that are doing economically better can send the wrong message and incentives, and it 
would work against the principles of decentralization and sub-national autonomy.  
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Table 16. Tax Collections from Fourth and Fifth Categories of Personal Income Tax by 
Region (2008) 
 
Total tax collections  
(thousands of nuevos soles) 
 
Share on regional expenditures  
(%) 
Tax collections per capita 
(nuevos soles) 
 
 
4th 
categ. 
5th 
categ. 
sum 
4th 
categ. 
5th 
categ. 
sum 
4th 
categ. 
5th 
categ. 
Sum 
             
Amazonas 615 1,283 1,898 0.2 0.4 0.6 2 3 5 
Ancash 4,227 22,012 26,239 0.6 2.9 3.4 4 21 25 
Apurimac 575 1,151 1,726 0.2 0.3 0.5 1 3 4 
Arequipa 667 12,755 13,422 0.1 1.6 1.7 1 11 12 
Ayacucho 93 217 310 0.0 0.0 0.1 0 0 1 
Cajamarca 1,981 8,399 10,381 0.3 1.1 1.4 1 6 7 
Cusco 4,892 49,829 54,722 0.6 5.8 6.3 4 43 47 
Huancavelica 812 872 1,683 0.2 0.2 0.4 2 2 4 
Huanuco 1,256 2,710 3,966 0.3 0.7 1.0 2 4 5 
Ica 3,376 32,008 35,384 0.8 7.6 8.4 5 45 50 
Junín 3,242 16,771 20,013 0.5 2.4 2.9 3 14 16 
La Libertad 7,634 58,968 66,602 0.9 6.8 7.6 5 36 41 
Lambayeque 3,479 12,513 15,992 0.7 2.4 3.1 3 11 14 
Lima 3,059 7,559 10,618 0.5 1.3 1.8 4 9 13 
Loreto 3,681 14,496 18,177 0.5 2.0 2.5 4 16 20 
Madre De Dios 609 1,379 1,989 0.5 1.1 1.6 6 13 18 
Moquegua 959 4,569 5,528 0.4 2.0 2.4 6 28 34 
Pasco 996 1,421 2,416 0.4 0.5 0.9 4 5 9 
Piura 7,146 48,225 55,371 0.9 6.2 7.1 4 29 33 
Puno 1,290 6,820 8,110 0.2 1.0 1.2 1 5 6 
San Martin 1,301 5,461 6,762 0.2 0.9 1.2 2 7 9 
Tacna 1,800 7,902 9,702 0.5 2.3 2.8 6 27 34 
Tumbes 564 1,778 2,342 0.3 0.9 1.1 3 9 12 
Ucayali 1,368 6,349 7,717 0.4 1.9 2.4 3 15 18 
Total regions (excl. 
Callao and Metro. 
Lima) 
55,623 325,448 381,071 0.4 2.6 3.0 3 17 20 
            
correlations:          
FONCOR       -0.33 -0.54 -0.53 
Extractive industries       0.56 0.39 0.42 
             
Source: SUNAT.          
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For illustration purposes, Table 16 shows personal income tax revenues for the 24 regions 
from the fourth and fifth categories of the Income Tax Law. As expected, total and per capita tax 
collections vary quite considerably across regions, and collections do not represent a significant 
share of expenditures. Even if the regional government were given all collections from the fourth 
and fifth categories, on average they would be able to finance only 3 percent of their total 
outlays. The limited benefit of this outcome is that the introduction of this tax at the regional 
level, after the central government creates the necessary fiscal space, would not significantly 
alter central authorities’ control of macroeconomic policy.  
As discussed above, the implementation of a piggyback personal income tax (based on 
the fourth and fifth categories) would inevitably create new horizontal imbalances at the regional 
level,48
Although less attractive as regional revenues sources, several central government taxes 
may still be considered as possible options for piggybacking schemes. In Table 17 we present 
four such taxes and provide information on the amount of collections to briefly evaluate some of 
their main advantages and disadvantages. The personal income tax (PIT) on capital income, 
which comprises the first and second categories of the Peruvian income tax, represents a very 
small proportion of revenues in the 24 regions considered, but this is partially explained by the 
 and an appropriate policy response is likely to involve increasing the proportion of 
transfers distributed with the goal of equalization. Given FONCOR’s limited resources, a natural 
response would be to consider redirecting the large amount of funds currently transferred as 
“ordinary resources,” which are distributed in accordance with historical spending patterns 
arising from regional expenditure assignments. It is not entirely clear at present whether 
“ordinary resources” are correcting or perpetuating existing fiscal disparities among regional 
governments, although we have seen some evidence above that their distribution may be to some 
degree equalizing. Nonetheless, redirecting “ordinary resources” toward a new unconditional 
equalization transfer program or a reformed and reinforced FONCOR would not only help 
address fiscal disparities but also rationalize and make more transparent the budgeting of these 
resources. Note also that some of the ”ordinary resources” could be allocated to a conditional 
grant program to help finance “merit” functions such as education and  health. These topics, 
however, lie beyond the scope of the present paper. 
                                                          
48 See the correlation coefficients in Table 16, which are relatively high and with negative sign when measured with 
respect to the FONCOR, and positive sign when measured with respect to extractive industries’ revenues. 
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fact that neither interests nor capital gains are currently subject to taxation. In contrast, the 
corporate income tax (CIT) and the VAT represent on average more than 11 percent of regional 
expenditures, and they could thus plausibly become important sources of revenue autonomy for 
regional governments. A very particular situation is observed for the excise taxes (referred to as 
selective taxes on consumption), which are virtually negligible for most regions but an important 
revenue source in Ucayali. The four revenue sources display a negative correlation with  
FONCOR, suggesting that their use for regional government financing would, in principle, 
exacerbate current fiscal disparities. 
The practical limitations of these tax instruments in the context of regional revenue 
mobilization are numerous and diverse. First, revenues from the PIT on capital income are small 
and likely unrelated with benefits from sub-national services. Geographical apportionment 
formulas can be used for the PIT on capital income as well as for the CIT, but these procedures 
are rather arbitrary and lead to imprecise estimates, as the U.S. case makes clear. The VAT is 
shared with sub-national governments in a number of countries using formulas based on 
population or regional GDP, but these are not solutions for increasing revenue autonomy. 
Regional VATs exist in a much reduced number of countries (e.g., Canada, Brazil), but this 
would certainly be a very complicated alternative for Peru. Excise tax bases can provide some 
options if there is the administrative technology to implement differentiated regional rates, but 
this is generally difficult. 
All in all, given the still poor tax administration and tax collection capacity observed in 
Peru, the use of the cohabitation of regional and central governments in bases like PIT on capital 
income, the CIT, the VAT and special excise taxes on production and consumption might not be 
advisable at the present time. However, future improvements to the system may help to increase 
collections to more significant amounts, reduce distortions due to noncompliance, and address 
the administrative complexities related with heterogeneous tax policies across regions.  
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Table 16. Tax Collections by Region of Alternative (Less Desirable) Revenue Sources, 2008 
 
Share of regional expenditures 
(%) 
 
Tax collections per capita 
(nuevos soles) 
 
 
PIT on 
capital 
(1st+2nd 
categories) 
 CIT  
(3d categ.) 
   VAT    Excises PIT on 
capital 
(1st+2nd 
categories) 
 CIT  
(3d categ.) 
   VAT    Excises 
            
Amazonas 0.2 2.0 0.4 0.0 1 16 3 0 
Ancash 0.5 10.8 10.0 0.0 3 78 72 0 
Apurimac 0.2 1.6 1.4 0.0 1 14 13 0 
Arequipa 0.2 2.9 3.4 0.1 1 21 24 1 
Ayacucho 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0 1 1 0 
Cajamarca 0.5 5.6 6.9 0.0 2 30 37 0 
Cusco 1.2 41.4 13.1 0.0 9 306 97 0 
Huancavelica 0.1 0.6 2.1 0.0 0 5 18 0 
Huanuco 0.4 3.2 1.2 0.0 2 17 6 0 
Ica 1.4 15.8 34.6 1.2 8 94 205 7 
Junín 0.8 14.3 11.6 0.0 5 80 65 0 
La Libertad 1.6 15.7 29.7 1.4 9 85 160 8 
Lambayeque 1.6 12.9 20.1 0.3 7 60 94 1 
Lima 0.7 3.8 11.6 0.4 5 27 81 2 
Loreto 0.7 9.7 4.1 1.2 6 78 33 9 
Madre De Dios 0.8 9.0 3.9 0.1 10 104 45 1 
Moquegua 0.9 4.3 9.0 0.0 12 61 128 0 
Pasco 0.2 3.0 6.2 0.0 1 27 58 0 
Piura 0.9 40.3 59.3 0.1 4 187 276 0 
Puno 0.3 3.4 4.2 0.1 2 19 24 1 
San Martin 0.3 4.1 4.1 0.0 3 33 32 0 
Tacna 1.1 11.3 12.7 0.4 13 136 152 5 
Tumbes 0.5 3.3 5.3 0.0 5 33 54 0 
Ucayali 0.7 11.2 9.9 31.1 5 85 75 236 
Total regions (excl. 
Callao and Metro. 
Lima) 0.7 11.4 12.6 1.1 5 78 86 7 
           
correlations:         
FONCOR     -0.36 -0.42 -0.48 -0.06 
Extractive industries     0.63 0.34 0.28 0.07 
            
Source: SUNAT.         
 
6.2   Options for Cohabitation with Local Government Tax Bases 
 
Piggyback taxes and revenue-sharing arrangements for intermediate levels of government are 
usually thought of as being based on taxes administered by the central government. We have 
shown, however, that this alternative is likely to provide limited resources to regional 
governments in Peru. So it might be desirable to look for other alternatives. One option that may 
be worth exploring is cohabitation by regional governments of some of the tax bases that have 
been assigned to municipal governments.  
Taxpayers paying local taxes are most likely receiving benefits from regional services as 
well. Thus, if there is an identifiable link to benefit from services in some of the municipal taxes, 
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as in the case of the real estate property tax or the real estate transfer tax, this link may be 
extendable to services provided by regional governments. The arguments previously developed 
about citizens’ participation and accountability of regional authorities could be equally valid for 
some of those municipal taxes.   
However, any cohabitation of bases or even revenue-sharing schemes involving local 
taxes might affect municipalities’ already scant incentives to collect their own taxes. There 
would also be vertical fiscal externalities where the decisions of one level of government would 
affect the revenue possibilities of another level.49
Although several local taxes could, in principle, be considered for the purpose of 
financing part of regional expenditures, only taxes on immovable properties have the potential to 
provide any significant additional revenues. Table 18 shows local collections from taxes on 
production and consumption and from property taxes. Taxes on production and consumption 
consist of provincial or district taxes on games, public shows and gambling, but on average tax 
collections add up only  to 4 nuevos soles (2 without considering Lima), and they are equivalent 
to less than 1 percent of regional expenditures. The tax on vehicle property has so far provided a 
negligible amount of tax revenues. Even though there may be some potential for this tax base in 
the future, including at the regional level, we will not look into this possibility any further at this 
point because we lack the necessary data.  
 In this case, allowing regional governments a 
substantial degree of discretion in setting their own rates—even within a certain range—might 
not be desirable given the current fragility and small size of local tax bases. A potentially 
different angle in this case is that regional governments may be interested in a fixed revenue-
sharing scheme if they are allowed to become involved with tax revenue collection efforts within 
their borders (for example, by developing the fiscal cadastre of real estate properties).  
 
                                                          
49 These vertical externalities are also present in the case of cohabitation or sharing between the central and regional 
governments, of course, but their significance may be quite larger in the case of municipal governments.  
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Table 17. Local Tax Revenue Collections by Region (2008) 
 
Share on regional expenditures 
(%) 
 
Tax collection per capita 
(in nuevos soles) 
 Production 
and 
consumption 
Property taxes Production 
and 
consumption 
Property taxes 
 vehicle transfer property total vehicle transfer property Total 
              
Amazonas 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.6 1 0 1 4 5 
Ancash 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.1 2.6 1 1 3 15 19 
Apurimac 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0 0 1 3 4 
Arequipa 0.5 0.4 1.5 3.5 5.4 3 3 11 24 38 
Ayacucho 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.8 0 0 1 6 7 
Cajamarca 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.7 1 1 2 6 9 
Callao 0.4 0.5 3.4 8.0 11.9 2 2 16 37 55 
Cusco 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.4 2.3 1 1 6 10 17 
Huancavelica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0 0 0 4 5 
Huanuco 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1 0 1 4 5 
Ica 0.5 0.1 1.4 3.8 5.3 3 0 8 22 31 
Junín 1.0 0.2 0.5 2.7 3.5 6 1 3 15 19 
La Libertad 0.3 0.2 1.5 3.7 5.4 2 1 8 20 29 
Lambayeque 0.5 0.2 1.1 3.1 4.3 2 1 5 15 20 
Lima 15.3 13.3 57.1 61.5 131.9 11 9 40 43 92 
Loreto 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.0 2 0 1 7 8 
Madre de Dios 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.4 1.6 2 0 2 16 18 
Moquegua 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.7 2.6 3 5 9 24 38 
Pasco 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.9 0 0 1 7 8 
Piura 0.3 0.1 1.1 2.7 3.9 1 1 5 13 18 
Puno 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.5 0 0 1 7 8 
San Martin 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.3 1 0 2 8 10 
Tacna 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.1 2.7 6 2 5 25 32 
Tumbes 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.2 1.5 2 0 2 13 15 
Ucayali 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.3 1 0 2 7 10 
  p           
National average 0.9 0.7 3.3 4.8 8.7 4 3 15 22 41 
Average without Lima 0.2 0.1 0.7 2.0 2.8 2 1 5 13 19 
              
Source: MEF. 
 
From Table 18 we can see that, for 2008, revenue collections from the property tax on 
land and buildings and the tax on property transfers represent 2.7 percent of regional 
expenditures. This is a rather small amount, but this proportion could be expected to increase 
significantly, even double or treble, with proper improvements in the administration of those 
taxes. In this context, there are several scenarios including an added fixed rate for regional 
governments, which would contribute at least 1 percent of the aggregate regional budget. This is 
a rather minor on average, but in some regions the additional revenues might still become 
effective in enhancing fiscal autonomy and accountability in the margin, and possibly also 
facilitating regional authorities to get more involved and interested in local efforts to increase tax 
collections. 
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6.3   Options for New Regional Taxes 
 
This is a difficult area, where it is as important to avoid poor choices of highly distortionary 
taxes as it is to find what new taxes may be a good fit for providing revenue autonomy to 
regional governments.  
Some forms of business taxes or business license fees may provide regional governments 
with an administratively easy way to tax the income of businesses that benefit from public 
services and infrastructure. This should be conceived of as broad-based levies on general 
business activity falling equally on labor/payroll and capital (assets) used by businesses.50 Maybe 
the best example of a well-designed regional business tax is Italy’s IRAP (Imposta Regionale 
sulle Activita Produttive).The base of the IRAP is basically the same as that of the typical VAT, 
computed as the difference between sales revenues and the sum of all purchases and 
depreciation. The IRAP is, therefore, an origin-based type of VAT. The rate applied by the 
central government is 4.25 percent, and regions are allowed to increase or decrease this rate by 1 
percent. The revenues are distributed among regions in proportion to the labor costs estimated 
for each region (and the tax rates applied).51 Another possibility is Chile’s patente municipal. 
This annual levy is paid on any commercial activity (trade, professional, industrial, and sale of 
alcoholic beverages) that requires a permanent office location.52
Another possible new tax revenue source for regional governments is the excise tax on 
public utility services, such as electricity and phone services. Besides revenue potential and 
relative administrative ease, these taxes may be attractive because of their link to the benefit 
principle; compared to other commodities, taxation of public utilities is associated with relatively 
low distortions because of relatively low price-elasticity of demand. In any case, they should be 
used with caution, as they could discourage the consumption of goods and services with positive 
externalities. In addition, while setting taxes on electricity consumptions one needs to weigh 
carefully the burden they impose on production costs for energy-intensive industries, and the 
resultant loss of competitiveness. Appendix 3 presents an estimate of potential regional tax 
collections from a tax on residential consumption of electricity. A tax imposed only on 
  
                                                          
50 For example, Bird (2003) discusses the business value tax (BVT) which is origin-based, and its base is calculated 
by adding payroll, interest, rents, and net profits on the basis of annual accounts.  
51 Keen (2003) offers a detailed discussion of the IRAP in the context of the Italian tax reform of 2003. 
52 Chile’s municipalities select rates between 0.25 and 0.5 percent that fall on the declared (to national tax 
administration) own capital of the business. The revenue potential is not insignificant. In Chile the patente municipal 
raises approximately the same amount of municipal revenues in Chile as the property tax (impuesto territorial). 
62 
 
residential consumption of electricity would avoid the creation of economic distortions, although 
our estimates suggest that it would not serve as a significant source of regional revenues. 
Green taxes, also known as environmental taxes and sometimes as pollution taxes, may 
offer an innovative and potentially significant source of revenues for regional governments in 
Peru (Gómez, Martínez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda, 2010). These taxes are an application of the 
“polluter pays” principle, by which those responsible for negative environmental externalities 
should also provide the resources required to correct the damage done to the environment and/or 
compensate those suffering losses due to that damage. There is a great variety of possible green 
taxes, and they have widely been applied in both developed and developing countries around the 
world.53
The implementation of green taxes in Peru has already been considered by the Congress, 
which in January 2010 received a draft law on environmental taxation. In line with international 
practice, the initiative considered taxes on contaminants like sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide, 
the polluting components of fuels, polluting factors of production and polluting consumption 
goods. The draft law opens the door for the creation of sub-national green taxes and assigns sub-
national governments (at the regional and local levels) the authority to establish new 
environmental fees. Of course, if this or a similar version of the law is finally passed in Congress 
some regional governments may gain a great deal of fiscal autonomy. Still, its implementation 
should proceed with prudence, as green taxes also have also some important drawbacks. The 
main potential problems with taxes of this type are that they might disincentivize productive 
activities and, the same as the revenues from extractive industries, they could increase fiscal 
disparities due to the uneven distribution of potential tax base. Because of this reasons regional 
green taxes should be subject to central some controls and regulations, and preferably 
accompanied with an increase in regional equalization transfers. 
 Examples of green taxes are those applied to air pollutants like carbon dioxide (CO2), 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide and fuels; to transport in the form of car sales and the road 
tax; to waste; and to different products such as tires, beverage containers, plastic bags, and 
batteries, among others.  
 
                                                          
53 Speck et al. (2005) provide an overview of the use of green taxes in European countries.  
63 
 
6.4   A Comparative Evaluation of Possible New Sources of Regional Own Tax Revenues  
 
In this section we have considered a great variety of possible tax revenue sources for regional 
governments. In the following discussion we provide a comparative evaluation of these 
alternatives based on what the literature considers the most desirable characteristics of a tax 
instrument. Table 19 shows the performance we might expect from each tax instrument under 
each desirable characteristic. We consider 10 alternative tax instruments, four of which 
correspond to taxes assigned to the central government, two assigned to the local governments, 
and four new tax instruments that could be created for the regional governments. The expected 
performance of the tax instruments under each criterion is initially rated as high (H), medium 
(M) or low (L). These rates are meant to be only preliminary indicators of the performance that 
we expect to find for the alternative tax instruments under each criterion; more accurate 
measures would require exhaustive analyses that go far beyond the scope of this paper. 
The first criterion considered to evaluate the alternative tax instruments is revenue 
potential, which attempt to capture the relative size of the tax bases and their room to grow under 
ideal conditions. As we have seen, most taxes seem to have relatively small tax bases in the 
country’s regions, but tax collections could be expected to increase with improvements in tax 
administration, tax enforcement and taxpayer compliance. In particular, the VAT (or general 
sales tax in Peru) and a version of the IRAP could be expected to provide very broad bases and 
great potential for increasing tax revenues. 
The revenue adequacy criterion summarizes how relevant the tax revenue sources would 
be in the context of the regional budgets. It is difficult to address this issue because the relevancy 
of revenue sources depends on actual behavior of a number of undetermined variables, such as 
the rates at which the regional government would be able to tax each base. In general, the 
cohabitation of tax bases with other levels of government should impose a limit on the rate the 
regional government would be able to apply, while the tax instruments that we are considering as 
exclusive for regional governments may not provide large amounts of revenues for all regional 
governments. 
Revenue buoyancy and tax elasticity of the tax base are similar concepts. The first is 
defined here as the change of the tax base with respect to economic growth or economic activity, 
and the second refers to the change of the tax base with respect to the tax rate. All tax bases can 
be expected to grow with economic growth, but differences should be observed as greater wealth 
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is transferred to individuals, used to increase the consumption of some goods and capitalized, for 
instance, in the prices of properties. The second concept, tax elasticity, depends on taxpayers’  
ability to evade payment. Some tax bases are more mobile, like those applied to capital and 
corporations, and others are difficult to avoid and evade, like those applied to individual property 
or the production and consumption of necessities. Overall, the personal income tax on capital and 
the corporate income tax are not recommendable as sub-national tax instruments. 
The correspondence between who pays a tax and its beneficiaries refers to the extent to 
which the benefit principle of taxation is fulfilled. Only collections from the personal income tax 
and the property tax can be expected to remain in the area where taxpayers enjoy the resulting 
public goods, and therefore only those taxes can generally be considered efficient and fair in 
terms of this criterion. The same might be true, but to a lesser extent, for general consumption 
taxes (VAT and IRAP) or taxes on electricity and phones, but this criterion is usually not 
satisfied by taxes on individual investments on capital or properties and the CIT. 
The economic literature identifies the distortionary effects taxation with the changes that 
it imposes on relative prices, which in turn can alter the location choices of individuals and firms 
as well as labor supply and other behavioral decisions. Maybe the most distortionary tax 
instruments among the alternatives considered is the CIT. This tax would distort the location and 
production decisions of firms, which will likely alter relative prices of goods and services in the 
national economy. The distortionary effects of other taxes are uncertain, but they can be expected 
to be less significant. In this case it is relevant to consider whether tax instruments fulfill the 
benefit principle, because adjustments in relative prices can be interpreted as efficient if they are 
correlated with the benefits from public goods provision. 
Administrative costs are particularly high for the property tax, and by extension the tax 
on property transfers, whose implementation requires properties to be appropriately valued. 
Other taxes may be simpler to administer as long as they are applied over relatively few and easy 
to identify corporations or sellers. In Table 19 we suggest that the administration costs of the 
personal income tax may remain at a medium level, for which we assume that its administration 
would remain largely centralized. Other important costs to be considered are those assumed by 
the taxpayers while complying with the tax system. Complex procedures are usually related with 
greater compliance costs, and when individual taxpayers are involved in the determination of tax 
burden (as in the PIT and property tax) it is not possible to take advantage of economies of scale. 
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If supervision and control mechanisms are absent, taxpayers and tax officials may 
attempt to capture part of the public funds. It is difficult to predict whether regional tax 
administration would introduce or reduce the opportunities for corruption, but given the still-low 
level of development of tax administration in the country and the incipient tax culture observed 
outside the main urban centers, it seems reasonable to consider corruption a potentially relevant 
problem for all the alternative tax instruments. In particular, the property tax (and thus also the 
tax on property transfers) might offer additional opportunities for corruption due to the atomized 
tax base, current difficulties in computing tax burdens and the absence of political and 
administrative controls. 
Accountability requires the taxpayers to get involved in government decisions, and we 
expect this to happen when they make direct contributions to the public budget and are able to 
influence the way the public funds are spent. Naturally, these conditions are more likely to be 
achieved with taxes applied to (most) individuals, like the PIT or the property tax. 
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Table 19. Evaluating Alternative New Taxes for Regional Governments in Peru 
 
 Cohabitation of regional taxes with: New regional taxes: 
 Central government taxes Local taxes     
 PIT CIT VAT 
Land and 
buildings 
Property 
transfers 
IRAP 
Elec-
tricity 
Phones Green 
 labor capital         
           
Revenue potential 
 
M L M H M M H M M M 
Revenue adequacy 
 
L L M M L L M L L M 
Revenue buoyancy 
(sensitivity to economic 
cycles) 
M M M M M M M M M M 
Tax elasticity of tax base 
 
M H H L L L L L L L 
Correspondence  
 taxpayers-beneficiaries 
H L L M H L M M M M 
Efficiency costs /  
Distortive  impact 
L M H L L M L M M L 
Administrative costs 
 
M M L M H H M L L L 
Compliance costs 
 
M M L L M L L L L L 
Latitude for corruption 
 
M M M M H H M M M M 
Political acceptability 
 
M M M H L L H M M H 
Accountability 
 
H L L M H M L L L L 
Effect on (increasing) 
disparities 
M M H M M M M H H H 
           
Desirability as a regional 
tax revenue source 
H L L M M M M M M M 
           
H: high; M: medium; L: low. 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based partially on Bird (2003). 
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Political acceptability is a key requirement for any modification of the tax system. In 
principle, it is not realistic to expect much political support for any tax increase, but a 
reassignment of tax revenues to regional governments might be accepted or rejected due to a 
sense of entitlement to tax revenues that could be found in Peruvian regions. For instance, 
regional politicians may gladly support the cohabitation of regions in the VAT, or the 
implementation of a regional general sales tax like the IRAP and green taxes, if they see that 
these alternatives are associated with greater fiscal autonomy. On the other hand, local 
governments might fiercely resist the cohabitation of their property tax bases with the regional 
governments, as they would interpret the regional share of their revenues as a loss of fiscal 
autonomy. 
The effect of new tax assignments on regional disparities is an important policy 
consideration for the central government and could plausibly influence the political acceptability 
of alternative new tax revenue sources for regional governments. We have seen that income, 
consumption and production are unevenly distributed across regions, which implies that all the 
alternative tax instruments considered here will likely increase regional disparities. Table 20 
presents basic statistics on the variability of those alternative regional revenue sources for which 
we have information on current collections; the table also shows the correlation between the 
alternative regional revenue sources and the FONCOR. In general, all sources considered display 
a high degree of variability across regions. The less variable revenue source is the municipal 
property tax, which displays a (considerably high) coefficient of variation of 0.6, while the 
difference between maximum and minimum over average per capita revenues is as high as 1.8 
times. The greatest variability is observed in the corporate income tax, which displays values of 
1.0 and 4.6 for the same measures of dispersion. 
By itself, the assignment of a new revenue source with highly uneven revenue potential 
can be expected to create additional disparities among sub-national governments. One important 
problem with the alternative revenue sources we are considering, however, is that their revenue 
potential is not only unevenly distributed, but also displays a high negative correlation with the 
FONCOR, which we use here as a proxy for fiscal needs. This suggests that in the process of 
reform it will be important to combine the assignment of new revenue sources to the regions with 
greater funds for the equalization transfer program so that no final additional disparities are 
introduced into the system. 
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Table 18. Potential Effect of Alternative Revenue Sources on Regional Disparities, 2008 
 (in nuevos soles per capita) 
 
 Central government taxes Local taxes FONCOR 
 
     PIT CIT VAT Land and buildings 
Property 
transfers  
 
labor capital        
       minimum 0.5 0.2 1.5 1.4 3.0 0.0 6.4 
maximum 49.7 13.4 305.9 275.6 25.0 11.0 134.8 
simple average 18.2 4.9 66.6 73.1 12.0 3.5 47.2 
weighted average 20.1 4.6 77.7 85.7 11.7 3.8 34.7 
standard deviation 14.3 3.7 68.2 68.7 7.2 3.1 39.6 
coefficient of variation 
(*) 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.8 
(max - min)/average 2.7 2.7 4.6 3.8 1.8 3.2 2.7 
  
       correlation with 
FONCOR: -0.53 -0.36 -0.42 -0.48 -0.44 -0.47 1.00 
  
       
(*) The coefficient of variation is equal to the standard deviation divided by the weighted average. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MEF data. 
 
All in all, there are no ideal revenue sources to increase fiscal autonomy of regional 
governments in Peru, but some alternatives perform better than others. As suggested before, it 
seems that the personal income tax on wages and professional income is the most attractive 
alternative, and that allowing for a piggyback rate range would help to increase the fiscal 
autonomy gained by regional authorities as well as to improve taxpayers’ participation and 
accountability mechanisms. Other alternatives might seem attractive to increase regional 
revenues, but they are associated with important drawbacks. The piggyback tax on the VAT 
would be very effective in increasing revenues, but it would be difficult to administer when tax 
rates differ across regions. A variant of the Italian IRAP would allow rate variation with lower 
administrative costs. Co-participation in local property taxes could potentially help to incentivize 
greater collections of this tax, but it would hurt the already weak autonomy observed at the local 
level. Finally, the creation of new taxes on electricity, phones or pollution seems very attractive 
as a way to increase tax collections and regional autonomy, but it would likely create additional 
disparities among regions.  
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7. Options for the Reform of Sub-national Revenue Assignments 
 
Improving revenue mobilization of local governments in Peru will require the implementation of 
several well-coordinated initiatives. On the one hand, the poor performance nationwide suggests 
that the very assignment of revenue sources could be revised. Governments that are not capable 
of collecting the revenue potential of their jurisdiction should either be helped to develop the 
required technical and administrative capacity, or collection might be assigned to another, better-
equipped level of government. For instance, the property tax on land and building and the tax on 
property transfers are currently assigned to district governments, but they might well be 
reassigned to the provincial level. Provinces may be expected to have technical and financial 
advantages for the administration, collection and enforcement of these taxes. Similarly, the 
property tax on is comparatively easier to administer, and thus it could be reassigned to district 
governments. 
On the other hand, the generalized lack of technical and administrative capacity at the 
sub-national levels calls for a more active role of upper levels of government in developing the 
technology and the knowledge required to collect taxes. The positive experiences of the semi-
autonomous SATs (Tax Administration Service offices) in a number of cities suggest that there 
is room for a significant increase of revenue collection after the introduction of modern and 
transparent collection agencies. This experience might not be replicable in all municipalities, but 
it still provides evidence of positive returns of investment in tax collection capacity.54
The situation at the regional level is quite different in that regional governments to the 
present have not been assigned any autonomous revenue sources and depend completely on 
central government transfers. Here then reform can almost start from a tabula rasa.  
 
 In both cases, however, it seems clear that one of the most important objectives of 
possible future reforms to Peru’s system of intergovernmental relations should be to increase 
sub-national fiscal autonomy and accountability. In this paper we have emphasized the 
interdependence of the principles of equity and efficiency and the importance of well structured 
sub-national finances for reaching these objectives.  
                                                          
54 Von Haldenwang (2010) analyzes the use of SATs in Peru and attempts to explain the causes of their so far 
successful experience. 
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In what follows we provide a list of the several measures that could complementarily 
contribute to increase revenue mobilization in local and regional governments in Peru and help to 
develop a sound system of sub-national financing. 
 
7.1  Improving Revenue Mobilization at the Local Level 
 
7.1.1 The Administrative Dimension 
 
• Asymmetric decentralization of tax administration. Tax administration and tax 
collections could be assigned only to those local governments that have the 
means to administer and enforce the collection of their assigned tax 
instruments. Upper levels of government might temporarily play a subsidiary 
role by assuming functions that cannot be satisfactorily carried out by certain 
lower level governments, but in some cases it might be reasonable to consider 
a permanent assignment of these functions to the higher level.  
• Capacity-building. The capacity to administer and collect taxes can be built, 
but many sub-national governments lack the expertise and the resources to 
reach minimum standards of efficiency. Low-level governments might need 
technical and financial assistance from upper-level governments in developing 
their tax administration and tax collection capacity.  
• Subsidized initial investments in revenue collection capacity.  This covers 
many obvious aspects. For example, in the case of the property tax, the central 
government could assume responsibility for developing and maintaining the 
cadastre of properties at a national level and for a certain period of time. Once 
the cadastre has been developed, the responsibility of maintaining it can be 
devolved to lower levels of government. Other arrangements are possible, 
including assigning the responsibility for the cadastre to provincial 
municipalities and for district municipalities at the regional level.  
• Outsourcing. The outsourcing of tax administration and tax collection services 
to private companies may be a feasible and effective alternative to enhance 
revenue mobilization and even to improve the legitimacy of local taxation 
(von Haldenwang, 2010). Even though this is still a controversial topic in the 
literature, some positive experiences involving the outsourcing of tax 
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collections in Peru that may plausibly be replicated in other jurisdictions. 
When other options are not as feasible or as effective, this alternative might 
help not only to increase tax collections, but also to develop technical capacity 
and tax compliance culture. 
 
7.1.2 The Policy Dimension  
• Reorganization of sub-national revenue assignments. Provincial governments 
are currently assigned the tax on vehicle property, which requires relatively 
low administrative capacity and spending, while districts are assigned the 
property tax, characterized by complex and expensive procedures. Given that 
administrative, technical and financial capacities at the provincial level are, on 
average, significantly superior to the capacities of district governments, it 
might be reasonable to consider a switch in the assignment of these tax 
instruments.  
• Modification of the distribution criteria of transfers from extractive industries. 
Ideally, the distribution of transfers from extractive industries, currently based 
exclusively on the location of the extractive industries, should be changed by 
other criteria that also consider the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of 
sub-national governments. In practice, however, such a reform might not be 
attainable due to the strong political opposition of the current beneficiaries of 
the system. For this reason, we suggest an indirect approach to reducing the 
distortionary effects of those transfers, based on a reform—in our view more 
feasible—of the FONCOMUN. 
 
7.1.3 Reforming the FONCOMUN 
• Introduction of a fiscal capacity measure into the municipal equalization 
formula. This reform would make it possible to partially correct for the 
inequalities and inefficiencies created by revenues from extractive industries, 
which are distributed on a derivation or origin basis without regard to relative 
expenditure needs or fiscal capacity. In the short run, or while there are not 
enough data to produce robust fiscal capacity estimates, it may be advisable to 
introduce only an adjustment that considers the transfers received from canon, 
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sobrecanon, royalties and customs duties. In the medium run, when more data 
are available, a more sophisticated measure of fiscal capacity that takes into 
account the ability to generate own revenues would help to increase the 
equalization power of the FONCOMUN even more. 
• Elimination of the minimum transfers of eight monthly UITs. The measure of 
fiscal disparity considers the ability of a government to finance its expenditure 
needs. If fiscal disparity is negative, then the government requires no 
additional resources to cover its expenditure needs. In this context, the 
minimum transfer is unnecessary and those resources could instead be used to 
support other governments in greater need. This measure would increase the 
equalizing power of the program. 
• Separation of the FONCOMUN into provincial and district components. The 
procedure by which the transfer fund is first distributed to provinces and then 
to districts is unnecessarily complex and leads to undesirable inequalities. 
Indeed, two identical districts requiring the same financial support might 
receive different amounts of transfers only because they belong to different 
provinces. The system would gain in simplicity and fairness by assigning a 
share of the fund to the provinces (e.g., 20 percent) and the rest to all districts 
in the country in accordance with their relative fiscal disparities. 
• Increasing the size of the FONCOMUN. A well-designed equalization transfer 
program contributes to enhancing equity and efficiency among sub-national 
governments. The impact of such a program can be expected to increase with 
the share of the program in the sub-national budget, and in the case of Peru the 
gains are particularly relevant due to the disparities created by revenues from 
extractive industries. One possible source of financing might be transfers from 
extractive industries, which if set as a modest proportion of current transfers 
or applied only to a portion of future increases in revenues from the extractive 
industries might enjoy higher levels of political acceptability.  
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7.2  Alternative Revenue Sources for Regional Governments 
 
• Implementation of piggyback or “flexible” revenue-sharing schedules for 
central government taxes. Regional governments could be given discretion 
within a range of tax rates on central tax revenues. A good alternative is the 
labor (wage and professional) income tax, which is paid by those individuals 
most likely to benefit from regional expenditures. The potential revenues are 
not substantial with respect to total regional outlays, but this limitation also 
allows for a wider range of discretion, which could contribute to fostering 
revenue autonomy and accountability. Still, since a more intensive use of 
labor income tax rates can lead to a greater push toward informality, these 
measures should be accompanied by additional tax enforcement efforts and 
other means to reduce labor informality.  
• Implementation of “fixed” revenue-sharing schedules for local government 
taxes. Feasible options for increasing revenue autonomy at the regional level 
are taxes on the value of properties and their transfer. In this case regional 
discretion over tax rates might hurt the already limited revenue autonomy of 
local governments, and therefore in this case such discretion might better be 
avoided. The participation of regional governments in local tax collection 
might also promote the involvement of regional authorities in the development 
of local revenue collection capacity and the control of its performance. 
• Introduction of new taxes at the regional level. There are not many good 
options here, but two possible candidates include business license taxes (in the 
vein of Chile’s patente) and excise taxes on the consumption of electricity and 
telephone services.  
• Creation of a new unconditional equalization transfer program/ improvement 
of the FONCOR. The implementation of regional revenue autonomy and 
revenue sharing schemes would most likely create additional horizontal 
imbalances that could be counterbalanced by additional equalization transfers. 
One possible strategy is to increase the funds that are distributed by the 
FONCOR, but at present this transfer is mainly focused on capital 
expenditures. An alternative solution is to create a new unconditional 
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equalization transfer program. No net additional resources would be needed if 
a share of the abundant funds transferred as “ordinary resources” (which are 
distributed in accordance with historical spending) are redirected to funding 
the new equalization transfer at the regional level. 
 
8. Political Economy and Legal Considerations 
 
During June and October of 2008 sub-national authorities and the populations of Moquegua and 
Tacna engaged in intense—and sometimes violent—conflicts about the procedure used to 
distribute the mining canon between the two regions. Representatives from Moquegua argued 
that a portion of the canon received by Tacna was actually financed with the extraction of mining 
resources in Moquegua. On October 30 of the same year, the Congress approved an amendment 
to the Law of Canon in which it made the mining canon depend on the final amount of the 
mineral sold instead of the total material processed, a decision that favored Moquegua’s position. 
In order to compensate Tacna for the reduction of revenues, the government later approved the 
disbursement of conditional transfers to be used for infrastructure investments in the region. 
Conflicts between Moquegua and Tacna are indicative of important political and cultural 
forces shaping the current system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. These two regions are the 
ones that benefit the most from the income tax levied on extractive industries,55 and at the time of 
the conflict they were not able to spend more than 30 percent of their budget on infrastructure 
investment.56
In this context, a relevant change in the legal framework of the canon, sobrecanon and 
royalties seems to have been accepted in political circles in Lima as unfeasible in the short run. 
 In this context, it seems reasonable to conclude that sub-national authorities and the 
population, at least in areas where the extraction of natural resources takes place, see the 
revenues from canon, sobrecanon and royalties as their legal right according to national laws and 
not merely the means to cover their relative expenditure needs. Moreover, it might not be 
realistic to expect that the same actors will show some solidarity to solve the problems of 
inequality and efficiency created by the distribution of these resources, or that the central 
authorities will be willing to assume the political costs of pushing for such a reform.  
                                                          
55 The sum of per capita revenues from extractive industries received by regional governments (see Table 14) and 
local governments during 2008 reached 2,012 nuevos soles in Moquegua and 2,748 nuevos soles in Tacna. Among 
the other regions only Ancash and Pasco enjoyed per capita revenues greater than 1,000 nuevos soles, while the 
average was 461 nuevos soles. 
56 See Krehoff (2008), who also provides a summary of the conflict between Moquegua and Tacna. 
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As a consequence, any solution to the problems of inequality and inefficiencies created by 
revenues from extractive industries will most likely need to be “indirect.”  
The alternative strategy suggested in this paper is to avoid the seemingly unrealistic 
scenario in which sub-national governments have to give up resources that they strongly feel 
they are entitled to, and instead to focus on reforming the distribution of central government 
transfers to avoid providing with additional resources those governments with sufficient 
financing to cover their expenditure needs. In order to implement the compensating mechanism, 
we have proposed in this paper introducing an adjustment in the distribution formula of the 
FONCOMUN. This transfer program is currently designed to compensate only for differences in 
expenditure needs, while the proposed adjustment consists of considering also a compensation 
for fiscal capacity. An equivalent reform was already introduced into the FONCOR in 2009, a 
precedent suggesting that this reform might plausibly enjoy some degree of acceptability at the 
municipal level. Still, the feasibility of the proposed reform is far from guaranteed. The size of 
FONCOMUN is equivalent to five times the size of FONCOR, so it is significantly more 
relevant, and any attempt to introduce changes in the distribution mechanism would presumably 
face relatively more political difficulties. The fundamental question here is whether those local 
governments now receiving both revenues from extractive industries and revenues from 
FONCOMUN would feel a less pronounced sense of ownership for the latter than for the former. 
Of course, it is difficult to anticipate local governments’ position on this matter. 
Other reforms that could face opposition are those involving the reassignment of revenue 
sources at the district and provincial levels and the participation of regional governments in local 
tax collections. District governments currently collecting significant amounts of taxes would 
have good arguments for keeping the property tax under their control, and they certainly will not 
like the idea of having their fiscal autonomy reduced. It will therefore be desirable, if possible, to 
hold them harmless in the revenue dimension. This can be done by limiting and conditioning 
regional participation in local revenues to the increase of revenue collections. In general, some 
degree of flexibility will be necessary in order to avoid serious political conflict and blocking of 
reforms. These reforms can be justified as a means to increase revenue collections only in those 
areas where collection performance is poor, and regional participation in local revenues should 
ideally be associated with a “price” paid by regional governments in the form of technical and 
financial assistance to develop greater collection capacity 
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9. Conclusions 
 
After more than eight years of fiscal decentralization reforms, the revenue collection 
performance of Peru’s sub-national governments remains at very low levels even when 
compared to similar countries in Latin America. The sources of the problem, we have seen, are 
multiple and require a well-coordinated set of reforms. Indeed, more than the necessary 
improvements in the administrative and technical capacity of sub-national governments, the 
solution to the problem of sub-national revenue mobilization in Peru will require an in-depth 
redesign of other important components of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
Potential gains from greater sub-national revenue collections are numerous and 
significant. On the one hand, sub-national governments would gain revenue autonomy, and this 
in turn would enhance accountability of sub-national authorities and thus favor more efficient 
expenditure decisions. On the other hand, greater sub-national revenue mobilization could also 
serve as an instrument to raise the overall tax burden in Peru. The optimal size of the national tax 
burden is a topic that goes beyond the scope of this paper; however, provided the country needs 
to increase government expenditures, greater sub-national revenue collections would help to 
meet the additional revenue requirements with high standards of efficiency in the revenue and 
expenditure side of the budget. 
 To address the core problem of sub-national revenue mobilization in Peru, this paper 
makes a number of proposals for the reassignment of revenues sources among provincial and 
district municipalities and for again providing regional governments with their own revenue 
sources. In the case of municipalities, the property tax now assigned to districts might be 
reassigned to the provinces, while the vehicle tax now assigned to the provinces might be 
reassigned to the districts. In order to enhance the revenue yield from the property taxes we also 
propose a series of administrative and capacity-building measures. Alternatively, the cadastre 
and property assessment functions could be reassigned to the central or even the regional 
governments. In the case of the regional governments, this paper explores the possibility of 
enhancing fiscal autonomy by creating new tax sources in three ways. First, by allowing 
cohabitation with central government tax bases, regional governments would have a piggyback 
personal income tax with a flat rate within maximum and minimum margins. Second, by 
allowing cohabitation with local tax bases, regional governments would have a share of property 
taxes. Third, there is the possibility of introducing an origin-based regional VAT, a regional 
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business tax and/or a regional excise tax on the consumption of electricity and telephone 
services.  
Another important problem at present is that a significant share of sub-national resources 
is not distributed according to the relative expenditure needs of sub-national governments. In 
particular, the revenues from canon and sobrecanon—the corporate income taxes on extractive 
industries (mainly mining, oil and gas)—are distributed among regional and local governments 
on a derivation or origin basis, exclusively benefiting those jurisdictions where the exploitation 
of natural resources takes place. Given that the presence of natural resources is not correlated 
with expenditure needs, the current allocation scheme creates severe inequalities and 
inefficiencies, which can be expected to increase with the importance of this revenue source in 
sub-national budgets. In recent history, international prices of several key commodities increased 
drastically during the period 2004-2008, raising the revenues from the canon and sobrecanon up 
to 13 percent of regional government revenues and 40 percent of local government revenues by 
the end of that period. 
Ideally, the fiscal disparities created by revenues from extractive industries should be 
resolved by directly reforming their allocation/distributional procedures; however, considering 
that this option may be politically unfeasible, we have proposed to address the problem in an 
indirect fashion. The idea is to reduce the amount of equalization transfers received by the 
governments that already have alternative financial means from the canon and sobrecanon. The 
reduction of the severe fiscal disparities currently observed at the sub-national level in Peru is, 
we argue, one of the most relevant policy reform priorities. This is because the reduction of fiscal 
disparities would help to improve not only the fairness of the system, but also to correct the price 
incentives faced by sub-national government authorities and thus also increase the efficiency of 
their expenditure decisions. 
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Appendix 1. Econometric Results 
Table A1. Determinants of Total Revenue, Own Tax Revenue and Non-Tax Revenue 
  
 Total Revenue Per Capita   Total Own Tax Revenue   Total Non-Tax Revenue 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Age group 0-6 0.0012 0.0014 0.0024  0.0008 0.0008 0.0009  0.0019 0.002 0.0028 
 (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0033)  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)  (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026) 
Age group 7-14 -0.0096*** -0.0098*** -0.0102***  -0.0031* -0.0031* -0.0033**  -0.0060** -0.0061*** -0.0064** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027)  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
Age group 15 or more 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0044***  0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0021***  0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Total land surface in Km2 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005  0.0005 0.0005 0.0004  0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Poverty indicator head count (%) -0.4101*** -0.4147*** -0.4461***  -0.3846*** -0.3852*** -0.3770***  -0.2202*** -0.2243*** -0.2613*** 
 (0.0846) (0.0849) (0.0916)  (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0447)  (0.0629) (0.0632) (0.0721) 
Illiteracy rate, 15 or older 0.3306 0.2731 0.3005  0.2777** 0.2785** 0.2251*  0.1743 0.1152 0.1656 
 (0.1826) (0.1835) (0.1998)  (0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0978)  (0.1357) (0.1364) (0.1571) 
Population 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002  0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
District dummy 9.5965** 11.2759*** 11.7359**  6.2576*** 6.2596*** 8.1083***  7.3377** 9.0923*** 9.1279** 
 (3.3646) (3.3792) (3.7203)  (1.6537) (1.6533) (1.7210)  (2.5052) (2.5162) (2.9327) 
Skilled employees ratio -2.3999* -3.1251** -5.1654***  -1.9214** -1.9469** -1.9013**  -0.6939 -1.3512 -3.4632*** 
 (1.1485) (1.1469) (1.2104)  (0.6611) (0.6603) (0.6601)  (0.9358) (0.9332) (1.0192) 
GDP per Capita 0.0761 0.0874* 0.1466***  -0.0135 -0.0119 -0.0027  0.0931** 0.1024** 0.1755*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0422)  (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0233)  (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0349) 
Agricultural population -19.3525** -19.0959** -27.3854***  -5.6722 -5.769 -4.5166  -11.4194* -11.0918* -20.0252*** 
 (6.0114) (6.0379) (6.5177)  (3.1303) (3.1317) (3.1568)  (4.4975) (4.5170) (5.1467) 
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Table A1. Determinants of Total Revenue, Own Tax Revenue and Non-Tax Revenue (continued) 
Total transfers  per capita 0.0325***    0.0001    0.0335***   
 (0.0013)    (0.0007)    (0.0011)   
Canon  0.0326***    -0.0003    0.0340***  
  (0.0013)    (0.0007)    (0.0011)  
Foncomun   -0.022    -0.0446***    -0.0092 
   (0.0193)    (0.0107)    (0.0155) 
Region and year Dummies YES YES YES   YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
constant 18.2726*** 18.2451*** 19.1776***  10.0931*** 10.0929*** 10.0693***  15.6435*** 15.5660*** 16.6819*** 
  (0.2233) (0.2228) (0.2340)   (0.1487) (0.1487) (0.1483)   (0.1912) (0.1901) (0.2035) 
            
Notes: Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A2. Peru:  Determinants of Total Revenue at District and Provincial Level 
 
  Total Revenue Per Capita 
  District Provincial 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age group 0-6 0.0051 0.0064 0.0068 0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0015 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.002) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0053) 
Age group 7-14 -0.0114*** -0.0118*** -0.0120*** -0.0127*** -0.0117*** -0.0113** -0.0115** -0.0104** 
 (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) 
Age group 15 or more 0.0035*** 0.0036** 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0050*** 0.0064** 0.0065*** 0.0061** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
Total land surface in Km2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0013 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Poverty indicator head count (%) -0.5083*** -0.4682*** -0.4736*** -0.4708*** -0.0493*** 0.4443 0.4771 -0.2148 
 (0.0812) (0.0870) (0.0873) (0.0953) (0.0049) (0.3149) (0.3168) (0.3343) 
Illiteracy rate, 15 or older 0.2735 0.3615 0.3036 0.2573 -0.0039 -0.2111 -0.2919 0.3117 
 (0.2051) (0.1880) (0.1888) (0.2083) (0.0106) (0.6534) (0.6567) (0.6974) 
Population 0.0001 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0015** 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Skilled employees ratio -2.175* -2.6726* -3.3358** -5.3579*** -0.2703 0.1154 -1.0650 -2.2532 
 (1.450) (1.1769) (1.1746) (1.2355) (0.2579) (4.1154) (4.1094) (4.3919) 
GDP per Capita 0.0660 0.0706 0.0816* 0.1421*** -0.0122*** -0.0947 -0.0908 0.1623 
 (0.0106) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0415) (0.0020) (0.5367) (0.5387) (0.5719) 
Agricultural population -18.1402*** -18.7834** -18.4081** -26.9090*** -36.284*** -38.5067 -40.7677 -29.7954 
 (1.5775) (6.1545) (6.1787) (6.7359) (3.1550) (25.2314) (25.3338) (26.9432) 
Total transfers per capita  0.0328***    0.0315***   
  (0.0014)    (0.0032)   
Canon   0.0331***    0.0317***  
   (0.0014)    (0.0032)  
Foncomun    -0.0606**    0.1728** 
    (0.0206)    (0.0655) 
Constant  17.149 29.3879** 67.8169***  33.1734 47.5213 68.4627 
  (10.5814) (10.5253) (11.7618)  (46.3700) (46.2576) (51.1916) 
Region and year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Notes: Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A3.  Determinants of Total, Own Tax Revenue at District and Provincial Level 
  Total Own Tax Revenue 
  District Provincial 
Age group 0-6 0.0013 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Age group 7-14 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Age group 15 or more 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0026* 0.0026* 0.0026** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Total land surface in Km2 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Poverty indicator head count (%) -0.4281*** -0.4283*** -0.4176*** 0.0102 0.0104 -0.0081 
 (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0473) (0.1399) (0.1403) (0.1391) 
Illiteracy rate, 15 or older 0.2750** 0.2756** 0.1973 0.1816 0.1787 0.1926 
 (0.1013) (0.1013) (0.1034) (0.2889) (0.2892) (0.2897) 
Population -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0009** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Skilled employees ratio -2.3100*** -2.3354 -2.2497*** -0.9456 -1.0003 -1.1559 
 (0.6794) (0.6786) (0.6781) (2.0076) (2.0045) (2.0170) 
GDP per Capita -0.018 -0.0165 -0.004 0.1047 0.1052 0.1168 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.2374) (0.2374) (0.2376) 
Agricultural population -6.3953* -6.5220* -4.6826 0.6706 0.5739 0.6196 
 (3.2474) (3.2492) (3.2874) (11.3620) (11.3648) (11.4012) 
Total transfers per capita 0.0001   0.0015   
 (0.0008)   (0.0016)   
Canon  -0.0004   0.0014  
  (0.0008)   (0.0016)  
Foncomun   -0.0649***   -0.0108 
   (0.0121)   (0.0294) 
Constant -9.8363 -9.4219 1.6477 -12.955 -12.0849 -6.3137 
  (6.2753) (6.2523) (6.5991) (23.0349) (22.9162) (23.7823) 
Region and year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Tobit estimates.Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A4.  Determinants of Total, Own Non-Tax Revenue at District and Provincial Level 
  Total Own Non-Tax Revenue 
  District Provincial 
Age group 0-6 0.0043 0.0046 0.0054 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0038) 
Age group 7-14 -0.0073** -0.0075** -0.0080** -0.0056* -0.0057* -0.0047 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) 
Age group 15 or more 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 0.0043** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Total land surface in Km2 -0.0001 -0.0002 0 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Poverty indicator head count (%) -0.2586*** -0.2638*** -0.2687*** 0.4016 0.4344* -0.232 
 (0.0652) (0.0654) (0.0760) (0.2153) (0.2178) (0.2375) 
Illiteracy rate, 15 or older 0.2066 0.1464 0.1434 -0.3444 -0.4231 0.1587 
 (0.1409) (0.1414) (0.1661) (0.4464) (0.4512) (0.4948) 
Population 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Skilled employees ratio -0.6727 -1.2726 -3.4458** 0.3966 -0.6728 -1.8404 
 (0.9857) (0.9821) (1.0688) (2.8510) (2.8500) (3.1937) 
GDP per Capita 0.0892** 0.0981** 0.1739*** -0.1403 -0.1396 0.1127 
 (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0352) (0.3670) (0.3703) (0.4064) 
Agricultural population -9.8475* -9.3827* -19.2468*** -38.8400* -41.1074* -30.4101 
 (4.6484) (4.6624) (5.3942) (17.2803) (17.4358) (19.2038) 
Total transfers per capita 0.0347***   0.0300***   
 (0.0012)   (0.0022)   
Canon  0.0354***   0.0303***  
  (0.0012)   (0.0023)  
Foncomun   -0.0355*   0.1714*** 
   (0.0167)   (0.0474) 
Constant -3.9594 8.6223 45.3302*** 41.8051 55.4637 74.1627* 
  (8.4597) (8.3917) (9.8270) (32.0829) (32.0601) (37.2942) 
Region and year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix 2.  Examining the Fiscal Effect of Transferring Property Tax to 
Provincial Municipalities and Vehicle Tax to Districts  
 
As previously discussed, under the current structure districts are in charge of collecting land and 
building property taxes, while provinces are in charge of collecting vehicle taxes. Unfortunately, 
around 20 percent of district municipalities are unable to collect land and building taxes at all 
and base their budgets on non-tax revenue and transfers. Vehicle tax collection is 
administratively easier to implement, compared to property tax. In Peru, police departments are 
in charge of the registration of vehicles; this fact, along with import registration, simplifies the 
collection of vehicle taxes for the provinces. Therefore, we simulate what would happen if the 
government decides to transfer the land and building tax to provinces, which have stronger 
administrative structures, and cede vehicle tax collection, which requires less administrative 
structure, to district municipalities.   
The methodology implemented is simple as we assume that the total land and building 
taxes (property tax and alcabala, or property transfer tax) are collected at the province level, and 
therefore aggregate the actual collections to a provincial level. Given the lack of available district 
information on cars, we proxy the car density by population density, and distribute the actual 
collection of vehicle tax by population in the provincial jurisdiction. While the implications of 
these assumptions may be strong and imperfect, we argue that they are valid for the analysis as 
districts highly populated will tend to have a higher car density. The estimations also assume that 
districts would be able to collect the same level of vehicle tax that the provinces are collecting 
and that provinces are collecting the same level of and building tax, assuming the same level of 
administrative inefficiency. Therefore, while we assume efficiency in the vehicle tax collection, 
we are underestimating the property tax and alcabala.   
As can be seen from Table A5, the straight change would cause a huge loss for districts 
as property and land and building tax collections account for almost 10 times the collections of 
vehicle tax. This fact suggests the need for further modifications such as tax sharing between 
districts and provinces. In addition, the mean of per capita tax collection is higher under the 
current arrangement. This is due the fact that under the new arrangement we assume that all 
districts would be able to collect vehicle tax.  
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Table A5. Fiscal Effect Estimation of Transferring Vehicle Tax to Districts, 2008 
 
 
Actual  Estimated 
 Vehicle Tax Alcabala Property Tax Vehicle Tax Alcabala Property Tax 
Districts                            -             136,363,005           431,061,152           85,610,154                               -                                 -    
Max                            -                              336                            869                            10                               -                                 -    
Min                            -                                 -                                 -                               -                                 -                                 -    
Mean                            -    5.72 11.50 0.67                              -                                 -    
Sd                            -    20.91 46.73 1.75                              -                                 -    
CV                            -                            0.27                          0.25                        0.38                               -                                 -    
Corr Foncomun                            -    -0.032 -0.001 0.420                              -                                 -    
Corr Canon                            -    -0.002 -0.009 0.120                              -                                 -    
 
Provinces          94,915,346           284,267,733           183,532,652             9,305,192           420,630,738           614,593,804  
Max                        253                            742                            126                            10                              42                              46  
Min                            -                                 -                                 -                               -                                 -                                 -    
Mean                       0.44                          8.19                        10.74                        0.44                          2.09                          7.40  
Sd                       1.27                        58.93                        15.28                        1.27                          4.57                          9.72  
CV                       0.35                          0.14                          0.70                        0.35                          0.46                          0.76  
Corr Foncomun 0.4851 0.7129 0.5257 0.4851 0.6092 0.3768 
Corr Canon 0.4659 -0.0311 0.2245 0.4659 0.186 0.2981 
Notes: In the current scheme provinces receive alcabala and property tax as they act as provinces and districts at the 
same time. Similar conditions apply to the estimated vehicle tax.  
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
91 
 
Appendix 3.  Estimating Potential Revenue Collections by Region from a Tax 
on Residential Consumption of Electricity 
 
Estimating the revenue potential of all possible options for new regional taxes is particularly 
challenging due to the lack of information about regional tax bases. Here we use a very simple 
methodology to estimate the potential revenues from a tax on residential consumption of 
electricity, which uses information about residential electricity consumption in Peruvian regions 
and the rates of a similar tax applied in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Electricity consumption tax 
rates in Buenos Aires province are 10 percent for residential users.1
 
 Potential regional tax 
revenues are estimated by applying a 10 percent tax rate on regional residential consumption of 
electricity. The total amount of tax collections obtained under these conditions, as well as their 
share of regional expenditures and the resultant tax collections per capita, are presented in Table 
A6. 
                                                          
1 Reporte de la Fundación para el Desarrollo Eléctrico: http://www.fundelec.org.ar/informes/info0010.pdf 
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Table A6. Potential Tax Collections from a Tax on Residential Consumption of Electricity 
 
 
Total tax 
collections  
(thousands of 
nuevos soles) 
Share on regional 
expenditures 
(%) 
Tax collections per 
capita 
(nuevos soles) 
 
       
Amazonas 148 0.0 0 
Ancash 5,212 0.7 5 
Apurimac 1,264 0.4 3 
Arequipa 11,454 1.4 10 
Ayacucho 1,730 0.4 3 
Cajamarca 2,028 0.3 1 
Cusco 5,370 0.6 5 
Huancavelica 704 0.2 2 
Huanuco 2,352 0.6 3 
Ica 5,058 1.2 7 
Junín 4,869 0.7 4 
La Libertad 9,960 1.1 6 
Lambayeque 5,690 1.1 5 
Lima n/a n/a n/a 
Loreto 3,781 0.5 4 
Madre De Dios 721 0.6 7 
Moquegua 1,381 0.6 9 
Pasco 954 0.4 3 
Piura 7,957 1.0 5 
Puno 3,533 0.5 3 
San Martin 2,567 0.4 4 
Tacna 2,682 0.8 9 
Tumbes 1,249 0.6 6 
Ucayali 2,330 0.7 5 
Total regions (excl. 
Callao and Metro. Lima) 
82,996 0.6 5 
      
correlations:    
FONCOR   -0.36 
Extractive industries   0.56 
       
n/a: not available    
Source: Authors’ estimations based on information from INEI- Peru, DANE- Colombia and DNP-Colombia. 
 
